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blurred double image of value haunts our discussion of purpose. The image of what counts as value for a single
firm is laid atop an image of what counts as value for business in general. These two images cannot match.
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mistake the properties of a part for the properties of the whole. A theory of the firm is ill equipped to handle
the many expectations we hold for business practice. As such, we seek to establish the beginnings of a theory
of business, one that is both empirical and normative. Offering four central propositions about the purpose,
accountability, control and success of business, we close with a consideration of several important theoretical
issues and practical opportunities that await us in the years ahead.
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Introduction
‘‘Law is to justice, as medicine is to health, as business is
to _____.’’
We have asked business students and colleagues alike to
fill in the blank above. The first reaction is always one of
awkward silence. People are surprised that the answer does
not roll off the lips. There is always a sense in the room that
we should know the answer and yet, we do not. Then the
answers come. A cluster of people will focus on profit,
money, and wealth. Others, more expansively, will talk
about value creation and prosperity. Still others will focus on
the likes of coordination, exchange, production, and
innovation. Some will take a decidedly macro perspective
and speak about commerce, the economy, collective well-
being, and society. And finally, some will shift gears and
focus not on wealth but greed, not prosperity but power, not
well-being but oppression. One colleague in a recent
Academy of Management symposium memorably said
‘‘our fucked-up global economy.’’ This exercise points out
three challenges when we think about the nature of
business. One is that we grapple with its purpose. The
second is that we have a hard time disentangling our
thinking about a single business enterprise from business
more broadly, an agglomeration of those enterprises in their
institutional and historical context. And finally, we know
that business may not be an unalloyed good. All of these
tensions are on display when we appraise our thinking
about the place of business in society.1
What is the purpose of business? While most agree that
the purpose of business minimally involves the creation of
value, today’s discussion is haunted by a blurred double
image of value. The image of what counts as value for a
single firm is laid atop an image of what counts as value for
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What is the purpose of business? While most agree that business minimally involves the
creation of value, a blurred double image of value haunts our discussion of purpose. The
image of what counts as value for a single firm is laid atop an image of what counts as value
for business in general. These two images cannot match. Indeed, the resulting conceptual
blurriness is a classic example of a composition fallacy. We should never mistake the
properties of a part for the properties of the whole. A theory of the firm is ill equipped to
handle the many expectations we hold for business practice. As such, we seek to establish
the beginnings of a theory of business, one that is both empirical and normative. Offering
four central propositions about the purpose, accountability, control and success of
business, we close with a consideration of several important theoretical issues and
practical opportunities that await us in the years ahead.
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business in general. We will argue that these two images
cannot match and that the resulting blurriness is a classic
example of the composition fallacy. Enumerating persis-
tent expectations and concerns about business practice,
we believe that a theory of the firm is ill equipped to handle
them. Working from a set of definitions that give precision
to such everyday concepts as value, dignity and business
success, our goal is to develop a theory with both
normative and empirical relevance. Since business works
both in society and for society (Walsh, Meyer, &
Schoonhoven, 2006), the theory must include both
empirical and normative elements. With this work as a
foundation, we then offer four central propositions about
the purpose, accountability, control, and success of
business. We will close with a consideration of several
questions, issues and opportunities that we are likely to
face in the years ahead. While this effort is admittedly
preliminary, we do hold some criteria for its success. We
hope that our ideas both align with known facts about
business practice and with deep, widely held intuitions
about values. Beyond that, we hope that others will be
moved to build upon these ideas in the coming years.
Business matters
To begin, we want to assert that business matters.2
While economic historians can debate the Industrial
Revolution’s legacy [see Allen’s (2008) review of Clark
(2007), for example], some facts are clear. Perhaps most
fundamentally, Riley (2001) observed that human life
expectancy more than doubled in the past two hundred
years (moving from about 30 to 65 years). He called that
the ‘‘crowning achievement of the modern era’’ (p. 1). To be
sure, the modern era is marked by all manner of life-saving
and life-enhancing achievements. Take medicine, engi-
neering, communications, and agriculture. Would we have
CT scanners, automobiles, smartphones, and drought
resistant seeds without business to develop the ideas,
create the products, and distribute them worldwide? Of
course not. Launching a new social progress initiative,
Porter and Stern (2015) looked at the cross-sectional
relationship between social progress (assessing what they
called basic human needs, foundations of wellbeing, and
opportunity) and economic growth (looking at GDP per
capita). Gathering data from 133 nations, they found a
correlation of 0.78. Economic and business activity can
certainly make the world a better place.3
That said we want more and less from business these
days. Tellingly, Margolis and Walsh (2003, p. 268) began
their paper entitled Misery Loves Companies, with the
words ‘‘The world cries out for repair.’’ With firms’ wealth
and capabilities so clearly on display as they reach into
factor and product markets the world over, Margolis and
Walsh observed that they are a ready target for appeal.4
Beyond providing quality goods and services at a fair price,
as well as local employment and investor wealth, firms are
also asked to sponsor all manners of public health and
community development initiatives. Kofi Annan’s (2001)
plea to the US Chamber of Commerce for HIV/AIDS help is
an iconic example of such an appeal: ‘‘Business is used to
acting decisively and quickly. The same cannot always be
said of the community of sovereign States. We need your
help—right now.’’ Case Western Reserve University’s David
Cooperrider created a Center at Case named ‘‘Business as
an Agent of World Benefit.’’ That name captures the hopes
of so many who look to the corporation for help.
On the other hand, many fear the firm. We have been
witness to what can only be called dreadful corporate
behavior over the past three decades (Greve, Palmer, &
Ponzer, 2010). Business legitimacy, and the social trust that
serves as its foundation, has been damaged. The 1981
Savings and Loan crisis shook business confidence for a
time. The business scandals of 2001 and 2002, however,
precipitated more than a decade-long loss of confidence in
big business. The misconduct at Enron, Tyco, and
WorldCom launched the trend. Such misconduct brought
us the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and turned their
disgraced CEOs – Ken Lay, Dennis Kozlowski, and Bernie
Ebbers – into household names (Coates, 2007). World-
Com’s July 2002 bankruptcy was the world’s largest at the
time ($103.9B). These three 2001–2002 scandals, however,
were just the most notorious. Looking at the data on
earning restatements in the 1990–2004 time period, Coffee
(2005, p. 201) concluded that there was ‘‘a hyperbolic rate
of increase around the turn of the millennium.’’ That is
when public confidence in business really started to ebb.
The concern born of the turn-of-the-century scandals
was fueled anew in September 2008 with the collapse of
Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual. With asset
values of $691B and $327.9B, respectively, each dwarfed
WorldCom’s fall and became the nation’s largest and
second largest bankruptcies in history (The 10 Largest US
Bankruptcies, 2009). As the financial crisis worsened, the
US government stood behind many more troubled firms
and offered billions of dollars to prevent a total economic
collapse. Accounting for all of the money is a difficult task
but we know, for example, that JPMorgan received $29B
from the U.S. government to buy the troubled Bear Stearns,
AIG received at least $85B to stay solvent, and all manner of
others (including General Motors) received portions of the
$700B that funded the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(Block, 2010).
2 As we point to the fruits of business, we acknowledge debates over
which economic system – socialism, capitalism, or some yet-to-be
imagined third system – is best equipped to support business activity.
That, however, is its own complex question (c.f., Kornai, 2000;
Schumpeter, 1942/2008), one that we do not attempt to address here.
3 As we say this, we know that the idea of ‘‘a better place’’ is open to
discussion. Some raise concerns about this new longevity phenomenon,
one where we live longer, die slower, and die differently than our
ancestors (Erickson, 2013, p. 6). Longevity certainly presents its
challenges (Erickson, 2013; Fishman, 2010; Gawande, 2014). And yes,
we know that CT scans expose us to radiation, automobiles pollute, smart
phones enable cyberbullying, and genetically modified foods concern
many. Still, we suspect that most would rather face problems attendant to
‘‘progress’’ than not enjoy the benefits at all.
4 A factor market is sometimes called an input market. It refers to the
market where resources and capabilities (e.g., historically, land, labor and
capital) necessary to produce a good or service are bought and sold.
T. Donaldson, J.P. Walsh / Research in Organizational Behavior 35 (2015) 181–207182
The Gallup organization has queried the US public
about its confidence in society’s institutions since 1973.
Fig. 1 reveals the responses they have received over those
42 years (Gallup, 2015). It pictures the contagious loss of
business legitimacy that we have witnessed over the past
decade or so. Legitimacy has fallen in tandem with rising
expectations – society expects more from business these
days than simply creating wealth. For example, a recent
survey tells us that just 7% of the US population believes
that business should only make money for its shareholders
(Cone Communications, 2013).
And so, we are torn. Taken as a whole, we hold out hope
for business to be an agent of world benefit but we are
wary of any single firm’s activities. While we have seen
efforts to better control the firm’s worst impulses (e.g., the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002), we have also seen many
more efforts to encourage what might be called pro-social
firm behavior. For example, created by the United Nations
in 2000, the Global Compact is the largest voluntary
responsibility code in the world. More than 12,000
companies in 170 countries have now endorsed it. The
Compact’s ten principles eschew corruption and promote
human rights, labor and environmental standards. The
Aspen Institute, especially with its Business and Society
Program, works tirelessly to encourage business to act as
force for social good. Its Purpose of the Corporation
initiative is its latest attempt to direct corporate activity for
the well-being of society (Keller-Fay Group, 2014).
Respondents to Fortune magazine’s Most Admired survey
annually assess firms on how they handle their responsi-
bility to the community and environment. Voluntary
standard setting organizations like the International
Organization for Standardization (with its ISO 14000
series on environmental management) and AccountAbility
(with its AA1100 sustainability, assurance and stakeholder
engagement standards) work to help firms do no harm.
Theory and practice in a world of wary expectation
With this kind of normative pressure on firms to serve
as agents of world benefit, it is no surprise to see firms
respond with a variety of what might be called corporate
social responsibility or corporate citizenship initiatives.
Research captures the effects of such initiatives on
attracting and retaining high quality employees (Backhaus,
Stone, & Heiner, 2002; Jones, Willness, & Madey, 2014),
cause marketing initiatives on attracting and retaining a
loyal customer base (Batra, Ahuvia, & Bagozzi, 2012;
Varadarajan & Menon, 1988), socially responsible invest-
ment practices on attracting impact investors (Dhaliwal, Li,
Tsang, & Yang, 2011; SRI Basics, 2015), and microfinance
initiatives’ ability to provide capital to heretofore ignored
entrepreneurs (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009). In
addition, scholars examine attention to human rights
(Spar, 1998) and the environment (Lee & Klassen, 2008;
Sarkis, Zhu, & Lai, 2011) in supply chains. Quite expan-
sively, Porter and Kramer (2006, 2011) encouraged firms to
scour their value chain for opportunities to serve both
society and their bottom line. Perhaps not surprisingly,
PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ (2014) recent CEO survey tells
us that 68% of all CEOs believe that the purpose of business
is to balance the interests of all stakeholders. Entirely new
legal entities have recently emerged to serve this kind of
ambition. The low-profit limited liability corporation and
the benefit corporation, for example, are innovative
attempts to create companies that pursue profit and social
good simultaneously (Reiser, 2011). Change is in the air.
Theoretical work tries to keep pace with this innova-
tion. Attentive to the yearning for social benefit and to the
many innovations themselves, we see efforts to under-
stand if not guide new corporate behavior. Looking inside
the firm, the Positive Organizational Scholarship (POS)
movement tries to articulate a new management para-
digm, one based on compassion, flourishing, and the
inspiration of positive deviance rather than one based on
compliance, control, and the mitigation of negative
deviance (Cameron & Spreitzer, 2013). More broadly,
alone (Prahalad, 2005; Hart, 2005) and together (Prahalad
& Hart, 2002), Prahalad and Stuart Hart tried to articulate a
new framework for business behavior, one that asks us to
look to the poorest among us for both new product and
service ideas and markets (see Kolk, Rivera-Santos, & Rufı́n,
2014 for a current review). Santos (2012) offered us a
positive theory of social entrepreneurship. And of course,
stakeholder theory has been with us for over thirty years
(Freeman, 1984). It has changed form and focus over time
but on balance, it offers the promise of a new theory of the
firm, one that might help deliver more business benefit to
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Pe
rc
en
t R
es
po
nd
in
g
Non e / Very Lile
Great  Deal  / Quit e a Lot
Fig. 1. Confidence in big business, 1973–2015.
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multiple stakeholders (Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar,
& DeColle, 2010). Pursuing that promise, Jones and Felps
(2013a, 2013b) recently derived a new objective function
for corporations, stakeholder happiness.
But these largely mid-range theories are not without
their critics. Speaking to the POS movement, Fineman
(2006) argued that the idea of positiveness is culturally
restrictive and not without a dark side. Hackman (2009)
worried about a lack of construct validity for many of the
movement’s key concepts. Karnani wonders if the fortune
at the bottom of the pyramid is an alluring illusion, a
mirage (Karnani, 2007). He suggested that the poor would
be better served if business, government, and civil society
worked together to create job opportunities and provide
the public services that are so necessary to live a
productive and dignified life (Karnani, 2011a). While
Santos’ (2012) ideas are too new to garner criticism, we
will see if they satisfy those who wonder just what
constitutes social entrepreneurship (Dacin et al., 2012).
High aspirations notwithstanding, Jones and Felps (2013b,
p. 268) admitted that their ideas might only apply for large
publicly traded firms in developed economies that face
little competition (one wonders how such firms will co-
exist with smaller entrepreneurial firms that focus on
shareholder wealth creation and thrive in competitive
markets). Finally we all know that stakeholder theory in
broad form has been a target of criticism for years. Jensen
(2001, p. 9), for example argued:
. . .stakeholder theory should not be viewed as a
legitimate contender to value maximization because
it fails to provide a complete specification of the
corporate purpose or objective function. . . .without the
clarity of mission provided by a single-valued objective
function, companies embracing stakeholder theory will
experience managerial confusion, conflict, inefficiency,
and perhaps even competitive failure.
These theoretical skirmishes are really a part of a larger
battle about the purpose of the firm. It is a battle fought for
decades, if not centuries (Avi-Yonah, 2005). The modern
debate began in the pages of the Harvard Law Review. Berle
(1931, p. 1049), worried about managers’ power and their
unfettered control of the corporation (Bratton & Wachter,
2008), averred that ‘‘the powers granted to the corporation
or the management of the corporation – are necessary and
at all times exercisable only for the rateable benefit of all
the shareholders as their interest appears.’’ As a matter of
theoretical parsimony and practical necessity, the interests
of the firm’s equity investors needed to be affirmed and
protected from those looking to run off with their money.
In clear sympathy with the need for investor protection,
Dodd (1932, p. 1148) nevertheless asserted that the
business corporation ‘‘has a social service as well as
profit-making function.’’ And so began the great modern
debate about the purpose of the corporation. Those
steeped in neo-classical economics tend to side with Berle.
Call them contractarians, shareholder-primacy theorists,
or those in the firm-as-property camp, they clearly see the
firm as accountable to the firm’s equity holders. If asked
about the firm’s social purpose, they point to the title of
Milton Friedman’s (1970) – now famous essay in the
New York Times – ‘‘The social responsibility of business is to
increase its profits.’’ Asked and answered.
But the question was not answered. Others, call them
communitarians, stakeholder theorists, or those in the
firm-as-entity camp, see the firm as broadly accountable to
society.5 Calling to mind the charters that first served as a
basis for – and constraint on – corporate activity, Nader,
Green, and Seligman’s (1976) book, Taming the Giant
Corporation, chronicled the social and economic cost
attendant to these new large and powerful corporations.
They called for a radical solution, a federal chartering
system, to ensure that society is well served by corporate
activity. Right or wrong (Walsh, 2005), many saw the
publication of Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder theory as a
direct antidote to the likes of Friedman (1970). Still,
Freeman (1994, p. 413) distanced himself from radical
rejections of stockholder–centric approaches. He knew
that his ideas were preliminary:
The temptation has been for a long time to depict the
stakeholder concept as a kind of rallying cry against the
stockholder theory. Armed with stakeholder maps on
our shields and banners, we have marched forth to
browbeat the infidels, mostly economists and finance
theorists . . . and show them that stakeholder theory is
‘‘better’’ than stockholder theory. [He confessed,] There
is no such thing as the stakeholder theory. . . .it is a
genre of stories about how we could live.
The challenges of globalization and the loss of
legitimacy noted above rekindled the debate at the turn
of the century (Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram, & Walsh,
1999). Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) clashed with Free-
man, Wicks, & Parmar (2004), Siegel (2009) sparred with
Marcus and Fremeth (2009), and Karnani (2011b) debated
with Rivoli and Waddock (2011) about the purpose,
accountability, and control of the firm. The neoclassical
theory of the firm is clearly under strain (Stout, 2012). It
appears to be incapable of harboring our dreams for
business practice that promotes social harmony, environ-
mental stewardship and at the same time, economic
prosperity.
A beleaguered straw man
Our extant understanding of business conduct is drawn
largely from economics, specifically what is known as neo-
classical economics. The economists offer us a theory of the
firm, telling us why the firm exists and how commerce in a
world of firms differs from commerce in a world of market
exchange. Known broadly as the neo-classical theory of the
firm, the power and reach of this work is impressive.
Indeed, William Allen, former Chancellor of the Delaware
Court of Chancery, once remarked, ‘‘One of the marks of a
truly dominant intellectual paradigm is the difficulty
5 The stakeholder/shareholder (Freeman et al., 2010), communitarian/
contractarian (Daniels, 1993), and entity/property (Allen, 1992) language
differences reflect paradigmatic differences. Management theorists prefer
the stakeholder/shareholder language, while legal scholars use the other
terms. Bradley et al. (1999, p. 44) offer a helpful table that summarizes the
differences between the two camps.
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people have in even imagining an alternative view’’ (Allen,
1993, p. 1401). Alternative theories have had a hard time
gaining traction.
The ‘‘neo-classical’’ theory of the firm is really a bundle
of theories, all loosely connected by their utilization of
concepts drawn from this view of economics. Seeing
individuals as primarily self-interested economic agents,
the theories are all grounded in notions of contractual
freedom, with an emphasis on prices and outputs
constrained by demand. The striking success of the neo-
classical approach to the firm owes much to the genius of
integrating our understanding of firms with the estab-
lished concepts of neo-classical economics. Importantly,
they give us a theoretical account for why firms exist in a
market economy. Moreover, these theories allow internal
transactions to be related to market transactions, firm
structures (i.e., hierarchy) to be related to cost constraints
in the broader markets, and concepts such as free-
exchange and contracting to be adjusted in order to
understand firm behavior. Not all theories, however, make
the same assumptions or have the same aims. Gibbons
(2005, p. 239) offers a typology that effectively distin-
guishes among different theories of the firm depending on
their foci: rent-seeking, property rights, incentive-system,
or adaptation (see especially pp. 200–201).
The literature utilizing the neo-classical theories of the
firm surged after Ronald Coase (1937), the 1991 Nobel
Laureate, published his seminal paper entitled ‘‘The Nature
of the Firm.’’ While the work in this area is expansive, one
stream examines the boundaries of the firm vis-à-vis the
market [c.f., Williamson (1985) and his work on transaction
cost economics] and another on the challenge of organizing
and controlling work in the firm [c.f., Jensen and Meckling
(1976) and their work on agency theory]. These ideas have
drawn extensive scholarly attention over the years [see
Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton (2007), Shapiro (2005), and
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for reviews of agency theory and
Carter and Hodgson (2006), David and Han (2004), Macher
and Richman (2008), and Shelanski and Klein (1995) for
reviews of transaction cost economics]. Their conceptions
of agency, transaction costs, hierarchies, hold-up problems,
shirking, asset specificity, and complete and incomplete
contracts offer compelling accounts of many aspects of firm
behavior. Our understanding of corporate governance has
especially benefitted from this work. And yet, fundamental
questions about the purpose and accountability of the firm
are still contested. The concerns are of two types: There
are what might be called proximate concerns, those born
of a close look at the theories’ assumptions and central
constructs; and then there are those that might be called
distal concerns. They come into view when we look beyond
the theories themselves to consider how well they actually
capture and inform organizational life and in particular,
how well society benefits from their embrace. We will
consider each in turn.
Proximate concerns
The neo-classical theory of the firm has been under
scrutiny for decades. Its salience and very success no doubt
elevated its status as a high-value target for academic
critics. Many of them approach the theory on its own
terms, granting some of its major assumptions and
challenging others. Davis (2005), for example, questions
whether shareholders truly ‘‘own’’ the corporation. Some
transfer well-known concerns about neo-classical eco-
nomics to the theory of the firm. Concerns about the
absence of perfect information, methodological individu-
alism (i.e., the idea that social phenomena can best be
understood as a function of individual intent and action),
and the oversimplification of complex social behavior, for
example, are all raised in this domain as well (Granovetter,
1985; Perrow, 1986a, 1986b). Others criticize the practical
implications of the theory. Calling the theory’s prescrip-
tions ‘‘wrong’’ and ‘‘dangerous,’’ Ghoshal and Moran (1996,
p. 13) argued that managers who unwittingly implement
these ideas could do more harm than good (see Ghoshal,
2005 for an elaboration of that accusation). Ferraro, Pfeffer,
& Sutton (2005) warned us that such theories could
become self-fulfilling. Still others worry about the double-
sided epistemic face of the theory. They worry that it can
be deployed – again unwittingly – as either a positive or a
normative behavioral account. The ensuing confusion does
us little good (Coff, 1999; Donaldson, 2012; Kim &
Mahoney, 2010; Zingales, 2000). To be sure, all theories
have their limitations. Problems will draw earnest
attempts to fix them; the theory will be refined in time.
Even still, one can wonder about the ultimate utility of the
ideas comprising the neo-classical theory. One can wonder
how well these unalloyed ideas, perhaps even with their
coming refinements, serve society.
Distal concerns
These concerns are audible and paradoxically, some-
times inaudible. The noisy protests, attendant to the
aggressive pursuit of competitive advantage and profit, are
unmistakable. Taibbi (2009), for example, began his
critique of Wall Street’s role in the recent financial crisis
with these now infamous words:
The first thing you need to know about Goldman Sachs
is that it’s everywhere. The world’s most powerful
investment bank is a great vampire squid wrapped
around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its
blood funnel into anything that smells like money.
The toll that our recent economic problems took on the
lives of everyday Americans is well known (Grusky,
Western, & Wime, 2011). The business misbehavior that
so fueled the crisis of confidence captured by the Gallup
organization is well chronicled in the media. Other
concerns, perhaps endemic to everyday business decision
making, may not always claim a front page headline.
Newsworthy just the same, they often constitute what are
known theoretically as negative externalities.
With profit the remainder as we subtract costs from
revenue, a firm naturally wants to minimize its costs.
Problems arise when firms pass their costs on to others.
Observers of contemporary business are quite concerned
about externalities. The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2014) offers a succinct
definition of the phenomenon:
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Externalities refers to situations when the effect of
production or consumption of goods and services
imposes costs or benefits on others which are not
reflected in the prices charged for the goods and
services being provided.
The most obvious example may be the pollution that
can accompany manufacturing. While the consumers of a
company’s goods may not pay for the cost of this pollution,
society certainly pays for it with a diminished quality of life
(Brandt et al., 2013). Other examples are legion. The
tobacco industry takes the lives of many of its customers
(Pierce, Gilpin, & Choi, 1999). In doing so, it wreaks havoc
with their families and imposes a public health burden on
the rest of us. The food industry contributes to childhood
obesity and a near epidemic of Type II diabetes (Lewin,
Lindstrom, & Nestle, 2006). The deleterious effects of the
gambling industry on the lives of its patrons and neighbors
are palpable. Grinols and Mustard (2001), for example,
identified ten social costs that follow the opening of a
casino. They tracked, for example, how the presence of
a casino can affect the perhaps obvious cost of an increase
in criminal activity, as well as ones that may not be so
obvious. For example, they called attention to what they
called ‘‘abused dollars.’’ Gamblers borrow this (soon to be
lost) money from family and friends under false pretences.
It is important to note that negative externalities can be
borne not just by today’s citizens but by future generations
as well (World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment, 1987).
While scandal and negative externalities sometimes
garner protest, we are struck by the silence that greets so
much of this news. To be sure, the financial scandals of the
early 2000s contributed to the passage of the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act. Scandal can fuel reform. Still, we have become
desensitized to egregious firm behavior. Consider the past
five years. In 2010, we learned that a Dutch court found
Trafigura guilty of illegally dumping toxic waste. Instead of
paying to process the waste in the Netherlands, the ship
sailed to the Ivory Coast and dumped it there, sickening
over 100,000 people (Trafigura found guilty of exporting
toxic waste, 2010).6 Already under fire for hacking the
phones of celebrities and politicians in search of tabloid
gossip, we learned in 2011 that The News Corporation
crossed a line into the world of the utterly despicable. In
search of the sensational story, they hacked into the
phones of terrorist bombing victims, deceased Iraqi
soldiers, and even a murdered schoolgirl (Watson &
Hickman, 2013). In 2012, HSBC paid a $1.9B fine after
being accused of laundering money for Mexican drug
traffickers and such countries as Burma, Iran, Libya, and
Sudan (McCoy, 2012). We learned the next year (on April
24, 2013) that the Rana Plaza garment factory building
collapsed in Dhaka, Bangladesh. More than 1100 people
perished (Burke, 2013). Dov Charney, the founder and
long-time CEO of American Apparel, was finally deposed in
2014 after presiding over what was euphemistically called
‘‘a sexually charged workplace’’ (Berfield, 2014). And
finally, 2015 bore witness to two scandals of massive
proportions. First, we first learned that the CEO and five
members of the board of directors of Petrobras, the largest
company in Brazil, were forced to resign after suffering
$33B in losses due to corruption and financial misman-
agement. The scandal even found its way to the office of
the country’s president (Iraheta, 2015). Second, we learned
that Volkswagen cynically skirted emissions laws on
11 million vehicles in the US, defrauding its customers
and exposing the world to dangerous levels of toxic
pollutants, all in its quest to become the world’s largest
automaker (Hakim et al., 2015).
We hear such news, see it as a tragedy, and then
continue to live as if it never happened. Our seeming
acquiescence in the face of such tragedy is itself a tragedy.
Indeed, some readers’ minds may even wander as they
read these words, muttering to themselves, ‘‘Oh no, not
another business ethics paper that tries to grab our
attention with horrific tales of business misbehavior and
malfeasance. . .’’ We know that the children who play
violent video games become desensitized to the violence,
demonstrating less empathy and prosocial behavior in
their lives (Anderson et al., 2010). It may very well be that
the persistent exposure to corporate wrongdoing and to
businesses’ negative externalities simply desensitizes us
to these problems. Yes, we want more from business. And
yes, we are drawn to initiatives that promise world benefit.
However, seeking broad theoretical guidance and legiti-
macy for more prosocial firm behavior, theorists see little
choice but to challenge – again and again – the dominant
neo-classical theory of the firm. Hollensbe, Wookey,
Hickey, George, and Nichols’ (2014) heartfelt plea for a
renewed focus on corporate purpose is perhaps the most
recent example. They are eager to discover ‘‘how corporate
purpose and the values that drive it might best be brought
together in the service of society’’ (p. 1228).
Sensing some futility, we are reminded of Winston
Churchill’s now famous words to the House of Commons
on November 11, 1947: ‘‘No one pretends that democracy
is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that
democracy is the worst form of Government except for
all those other forms that have been tried from time to
time. . .’’ Channeling Churchill, one might say, ‘‘No one
pretends that the neo-classical theory of the firm is perfect
or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that the neo-classical
theory of the firm may the worst theory of the firm, except
for all those other theories that have been tried from time
to time.’’ Indeed, for all the hearty and heartfelt criticism of
contractarianism, the communitarian paradigm may not
offer a positive logic to organize economic production. It
may be more of a protest movement than a workable
theory of economic production (Bradley et al., 1999, p. 47).
Still, it may be time to give the neo-classical theory of the
firm, our beleaguered straw man, a break. The solution to
our theoretical problems may lie elsewhere.
On balance, the neo-classical theory of the firm may
serve business leaders fairly well. The issue is that the
theory was not developed to address society’s interest in
business activity, the source of the distal problems we
6 Greenpeace detailed the charges and excoriated the company in a
231-page report entitled The Toxic Truth hhttp://www.greenpeace.org/
international/en/publications/Campaign-reports/Toxics-reports/The-
Toxic-Truth/i
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identify here. While the theory’s proximate concerns are
real and deserve attention, the distal questions and
concerns pose problems for a theory ill equipped to handle
them. We do not need a theory of the firm to address these
problems; we need a theory of business. We need a theory
that can answer the riddle posed at the beginning of this
work: ‘‘Law is to justice, as medicine is to health, as
business is to _____?’’ Absent such a theory, we suffer a
fallacy of composition.
A fallacy of composition
A fallacy is a form of deceptively bad argument. A
fallacy of composition occurs when one assumes that the
property of a part, or of all parts, can be taken to represent
the whole. Hansen (2015, p. 5), a philosopher who has
written widely about fallacies, offers the following
example: Every member of the investigative team is an
excellent researcher. Therefore, the team is an excellent
one. This inference will not hold if the team members do
not work well together. There is more to an excellent team
than the quality of its membership.
Such a deceptive line of reasoning can tempt false
conclusions in management theory. Imagine that the
purpose of a firm is to maximize its shareholders’ wealth
or, say, to delight its customers. We must remember that a
single firm is just one part of the broad agglomeration of
firms that comprise business activity, activity that sits
squarely in its institutional and historical context. We
should take great care before we conclude that the purpose
of business is to maximize shareholder returns or to
delight customers. The composition fallacy alerts us to the
possibility that the attributes of a successful firm may not
be the same as the attributes of successful business in
general.
A closely related confusion, while not a fallacy per se, is
the conflation of business means with business ends.
Operational efficiency, for example, may be crucial to a
firm’s success and even to business success, but it would be
a mistake to conclude that efficiency itself is any kind of
ultimate firm or business goal. The temptation to do so is
real but we need to be alert to the problem of goal
displacement as we consider purpose, especially if that
purpose is more intangible than many of the means to that
end (Warner & Havens, 1968). Consider engines. At a time
when the social sciences grapple with bouts of physics
envy (Flyvberg, 2001), a look at the limitations of physics is
instructive.
One can define a mechanical engine as a machine with
moving parts that converts power into motion. There have
been and are many engines: the ancient Greek (Hero)
wind–wheel engine that drove an organ, the steam engine
that drove locomotives, the modern internal combustion
engine that is ubiquitous today, and the atomic fission
engine that powers nuclear submarines. Physical theories
dealing with one particular aspect of engines, namely, their
ability to overcome friction and convert power into
motion, have inspired more and more efficient engines.
But as powerful as these ideas have been for improving
efficiency, we do not fully understand what an engine
really is until we relate it to its human value. Even a
supremely intelligent scientist from another galaxy would
not know what an ‘‘engine’’ is without some theory that
references its use and purpose, such as in transportation.
Otherwise, it is simply a ‘‘machine with moving parts.’’
Similarly, it is impossible to understand fully the nature
of business in society by simply looking at the descrip-
tive principles that undergird the creation of a firm in
society.
Our goal here is to begin to develop a conceptually
robust theory of business. Again, it will be an empirical and
normative theory. Well aware of the promise of value free
science – and the scorn that may befall those who bring a
consideration of values to science – we are nevertheless
intent on developing a normative theory. Not mincing
words, Weber (1922/1968, pp. 152, 155) pointed to the
peril in our path:
Science today is a ‘vocation’ organized in special
disciplines in the service of self-clarification and
knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not the gift of
grace of seers and prophets dispensing sacred values
and revelations, nor does it partake of the contempla-
tion of sages and philosophers about the meaning of the
universe.’’ He went on to say, ‘‘To the person who
cannot bear the fate of the times like a man, one must
say: may he rather return silently, without the usual
publicity build-up of renegades, but simply and plainly.
The arms of the old churches are opened widely and
compassionately for him.
With all respect to such a towering intellectual figure,
we cannot bear the fate of our times silently. If there are
sacred values that might commingle with rigorous
scientific inquiry to better humanity, then we are remiss
to ignore them. We cannot duck a consideration of the
human value of business activity as we seek to understand
it. Amartya Sen, the 1998 Noble Laureate, pointed out that
‘‘economic sense’’ is defined in either of two ways: one
includes the achievement of a good society; the other
narrowly concerns itself with business profits and rewards
(Sen, 1993, p. 52). We hope to define and expand the first of
these two notions, the economic sense that undergirds a
good society. In the end, we hope to account for the audible
and inaudible concerns we identified above. We intend to
account for the intellectual disenchantment, the third
party activism, and the contemporary search for new
business models. As we do, we will pay close attention to
fundamental intuitions about the nature of the human
person and humanity.
Theoretical foundations
Definitions for a theory of business
Language brings our world into relief. Specialized
languages such as mathematics, logic, topology, and yes,
economics, systemize thinking with extreme clarity. The
linguistic philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, compared
specialized languages to new suburbs in urban areas—they
are new entrants to an existing linguistic territory
(Wittgenstein, 1953). As we have seen, however, the
critics and defenders of the beleaguered straw man, the
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neo-classical theory of the firm, often talk past one another
because the specialized language of neo-classical theories
has difficulty interpreting issues lying outside its scope.
The strength of specialized languages is that they embody
sharper tools for particular purposes. Their weakness
connects to their strength, however; their acuity comes at
the cost of conceptual narrowness. For example, the
language of DNA and genetic biology may do a good job of
explaining how a zygote becomes a human being but it
does a poor job of explaining how a human being will fall
in love with another, create a new zygote, and reproduce
the species.
When neo-classical theories of governance are criti-
cized for a failure to address issues outside their purview
(e.g., for failing to address broad questions of sustainabili-
ty), critics must borrow terms lying outside the specialized
language. They are forced to borrow terminology from
natural languages, using such words citizenship, stake-
holder, team, and family to make their case. They are
driven to frame corporations as corporate citizens,
production teams, collections of stakeholders, or even
families. Inevitably, their criticisms appear less sophisti-
cated than the theories they criticize.
Neo-classical theories function reasonably well for their
designed purpose. The issue is that their purpose is limited.
In order to reach beyond their designed scope, we require
different terms and different theories. If we want to
achieve distinctive depth and clarity, we require a
specialized language. The specialized language of any
theory is effected through the articulation of definitions,
postulates, and assumptions. From Euclidian geometry to
Newtonian Physics and modern microeconomics, the
crucial elements of theory are definitions. For this reason,
we begin our effort to develop a theory of business by first
articulating a set of basic definitions. Our aspirations are
modest. We do not mean to offer the last word on a
prospective theory of business. Instead, we offer a first. We
invite others to assess our elementary definitions and then
help us refine and extend them. The project we envision
is a long-term one. Only the cooperation of a great many
colleagues will ensure its success.
Any theory of business needs to focus on four key ideas.
Three of these are common to the contemporary literature
on corporate governance, namely, we must consider the
purpose, accountability and control of business. And given
that ours is to be a normative theory as well as an
empirical one, we will appraise the ultimate conduct of
business—we will consider the nature of business success.
With these four aspirations in mind, we offer the following
definitions.
1. Business: a form of cooperation involving the Produc-
tion, Exchange and Distribution of goods and services
for the purpose of achieving Collective Value.
2. Business Participant: someone who affects or is
affected by the pursuit of Collective Value. Some
Business Participants are identified through their
membership in entities that affect or are affected by
the pursuit of Collective Value.
3. Positive Value: a reason for acting where the object of
the act is seen as worthy of pursuit.
4. Negative Value: a reason for acting where the object of
the act is seen as aversive.
5. Intrinsic Value: a Positive Value whose worth does not
depend on its ability to achieve other Positive Values.
6. Benefit: the contributions made by Business to the
satisfaction of a Business Participant’s Positive and
Intrinsic Values, net of any aversive impact on the
satisfaction of those same values.
7. Collective Value: the agglomeration of the Business
Participants’ Benefits, again, net of any aversive
Business outcomes.
8. Dignity: an Intrinsic Value prescribing that each
Business Participant be treated with respect, compati-
ble with each person’s inherent worth.
9. Dignity Threshold: the minimum level of respect
accorded to each Business Participant necessary to
allow the agglomeration of Benefit to qualify as
Business Success.
10. Business Success: optimized Collective Value, opti-
mized subject to clearing the Dignity Threshold.
Equifinalty assumed, alternative states of Business
Success are possible.
Business and business participants
We understand Business to include a system of
production, exchange, and distribution relationships
among and between the entities that constitute firms’
value chains: firms themselves, civil society, institutions of
government, and the communities that both sustain and
benefit from business activity. All of these entities, and the
individuals that comprise them, participate in business
activity. However, we reserve the term ‘‘Business Partici-
pant’’ for those who are the ultimate bearers of value,
namely, persons. Many but not all Business Participants are
identified through their membership in business entities.
The term, Business Participant, expansively includes
anyone who affects or is affected by business. As such,
our definition echoes Freeman’s (1984) capacious intuition
about stakeholder identification. That said, we use the
term ‘‘participant’’ and not ‘‘stakeholder’’ here. We do so
because of the latter’s longstanding association with the
management of discrete business entities, not the conduct
of business broadly (as we are examining here).7 Produc-
tion is a cooperative process in which inputs generate
outputs, goods or services in the world of business.
Exchange is a voluntary and cooperative process in which
a good or a service is given in anticipation of a return. And
distribution captures both the cooperative processes by
which those goods and services reach their buyers and the
resulting pattern of who does or does not buy them.
7 For example, note that Freeman et al. (2010) began their impressive
review and assessment of stakeholder theory by talking about ‘‘a
business’’ [‘‘Stakeholder theory suggests that if we adopt as the unit of
analysis the relationship between a business and the groups and
individuals who can affect or are affected by it, then. . .’’ (p. 5)]. They
ended their book talking about ‘‘the business’’ [‘‘. . .at the center of
starting, managing, and leading a business is a set of stakeholder
relationships which define the business’’ (p. 291)]. Taking absolutely
nothing away from stakeholder theory and its many contributions, our
focus here is different.
T. Donaldson, J.P. Walsh / Research in Organizational Behavior 35 (2015) 181–207188
It may strike some as odd that our definition of business
emphasizes cooperation instead of competition. To be sure,
competition plays an essential role in business. Many even
see it as the heartbeat of market capitalism. Still, if we want
to understand the purpose, accountability, control, and
success of business, we must place competition in its
proper context. Competition is significant because it serves
as an important means to maximize value. However, it is
not the only means to create value. The ability of groups to
cooperate in competitive systems is also recognized as a
critical economic success factor (Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon,
1997; Markussen, Reuben, & Tyran, 2014). With competi-
tion so celebrated in contemporary society (Stalk, 2006;
Stalk & Lachenauer, 2004), we need to be alert to goal
displacement (means/ends inversion). We need to keep in
mind that competition itself is not the goal of business.
Effective competition requires the social consent that
we see embodied in our cooperative institutions. For
example, an independent judiciary that enforces contracts
and property rights and the regulatory institutions that
forestall harmful monopolies together enable markets
to function properly. Social contracts help to form the
normative underpinnings of business (Donaldson &
Dunfee, 1994, 1995, 1999; Sacconi, 2006, 2007). We
cooperatively create, manage and participate in competi-
tive markets to create collective value.
Positive and negative values
The term ‘‘value’’ is commonly heard in discussions of
economics and business. Interestingly, it is often left
undefined, or when defined, interpreted through a price
mechanism or systematized preference rankings (includ-
ing the analysis of indifference). In contrast, the concept of
value is ubiquitous and the object of extensive analysis in
moral theory. Each one of the many respected attempts to
systemize morals over more than two millennia may be
said to entail some definition of value, either directly or
indirectly (Aquinas, 1945; Aristotle, 1962; Hamilton &
Cairns, 1961; Kant, 1949, 1959; Mill, 2001; Moore, 1903;
Ross, 1930; Sidgwick & Jones, 1901; Spinoza & Parkinson,
2000). That said, non-philosophers are often surprised not
by the divergence of ethical views in moral philosophy, but
by their convergence. While disagreements rage over
meta-ethical issues such as moral realism (the question of
whether moral qualities are reflected directly in ‘‘facts’’),
the more basic normative moral questions have surpris-
ingly convergent answers. Noisy disputes about abortion,
gay marriage, and the role of religion in society may
command our attention, but the fact is that we all share
similar views about such basic values as health, dignity,
and justice.
Popularized by Rawls (1971/1999, 1993/2005), the
term ‘‘overlapping consensus’’ denotes how people who
support different underlying normative doctrines, includ-
ing different religious doctrines, can still agree on specific
principles of justice. We use it here more expansively to
refer to values that are endorsed, although to varying
degrees, by people with different cultural and religious
views. For example, some version of the Golden Rule is
found in every one of the world’s major religions. Members
of the United Nation’s General Assembly endorsed the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 without
dissent. It enshrines such basic values as dignity and
freedom. In the world of positive psychology, Dahlsgaard,
Peterson, & Seligman (2005) examined Eastern and
Western philosophical and religious traditions, isolating
six core virtues that recur in the writings: courage, justice,
humanity, temperance, wisdom, and transcendence. Re-
latedly, social psychologists often find patterned regularity
when they examine moral notions around the world (Haidt
& Kesebir, 2010). In all, we see an overlapping global
consensus about such values as freedom, beneficence, self-
control, knowledge, happiness, family, friendship, envi-
ronmental quality, security, integrity, the right to own
property, self-respect, and fairness. In business, the same is
true. A recent global survey found that employees agree on
core standards such as integrity, fair dealing and promise
keeping (Paine, Deshpande, & Margolis, 2011). This kind of
convergence offers a clue to the non-arbitrary foundation
for the classification of human values.8 We will elaborate
upon that non-arbitrary status when we better consider
the definition of Intrinsic Value.
We define a Positive Value as a reason for acting when
the object of the act is seen as worthy of pursuit. In other
words, a Positive Value is someone’s reason for acting. This
definition taps a deep legacy in moral philosophy, one that
defines values in terms of reasons and one that relates
values to human interests (c.f., Perry, 1914, 1926). By
definition, some reason or other, whether good or bad,
motivates intentional behavior. T.M. Scanlon’s view,
reflected in the approaches of contemporary moral
theorists, is that ‘‘to call something valuable is to say that
it has other properties that provide reasons for behaving in
certain ways with respect to it’’ (Scanlon, 1998, p. 96). The
language of values can confuse because insofar as ‘‘value’’
is a noun, the term suggests that values are things in the
world, akin to physical objects. But using value as noun is
not meant to reify values; it is simply a shorthanded way to
reference the process of deliberate action wherein
someone acts for an underlying reason.
In turn, a Negative Value constitutes a reason for not
acting or avoiding something undesirable or aversive. It is
often the negative form of a positive value. For example,
the negative value of sickness finds its opposite in the
positive value of health. We introduce the concept of
negative and positive values in order to capture the
richness of ordinary language. Some words in a given
language express a value even though the language lacks
an exact word for its opposite (in such cases, we struggle to
find many words to serve as an antonym). The word
‘‘interference,’’ for example, finds no precise English
language opposite. While words like cooperation, facilita-
tion, encouragement, enable and assist come to mind, a
8 Contrariwise, the cynical view of ethics expressed in the so-called
doctrine of ‘‘normative ethical relativism’’ is not seriously defended in
moral philosophy. This doctrine holds that ‘‘If someone thinks it is right
(or wrong) to do A, then it is right (or wrong) for him to do A.’’ As Richard
Brandt noted, despite rather wide popular acceptance, this doctrine is
thought to be absurd by philosophers because it implies ‘‘that there is no
point in debating with a person [about] what is right for him to do unless
he is in doubt himself’’ (Brandt, 1967, p. 76).
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person looking to avoid interference merely seeks the
absence of interference, or ‘‘non-interference.’’ That said, it
may be necessary to assume precise value polarity (i.e., the
idea that any negative value can be construed as the
negation of a positive value, and vice versa) when we
grapple with how best to measure value satisfaction.
A value can serve as one person’s reason for acting and
not another’s. In other words, values can be matters of
personal taste. My reason for acting in a particular instance
may be to avoid buying a car, and yours may be the
opposite. You may want to buy a car to stop riding a city
bus; I may move to a convenient bus line in order to sell my
car. Such values, whether positive or negative, are agent-
specific.
Intrinsic value
Some values are not agent-specific. Such values are
Intrinsic Values. Suppose that owning more land is a value
for you, and someone asks you why you value owning
more land. If you attempt to give a persuasive answer, you
need to appeal to a higher-order reason that is under-
standable to the questioner. You might reply that owning
more land gives you a sense of security, with the inference
that your higher-order reason is the value of security. This
answer may well satisfy your questioner since the both of
you probably agree that security is a value. But suppose the
person surprises you and follows up with another
question, ‘‘Why do you value security?’’ Here, your reply
may well be something like ‘‘I don’t value security for some
further reason; rather, security is something I think has
intrinsic worth.’’ In other words, you would be saying, ‘‘I
think security is an intrinsic value.’’ When something that
is ‘‘worthy of pursuit’’ does not have its own value derived
from a higher-order value, it counts as an Intrinsic Value. It
is a final reason for acting. Intrinsic values, in turn, possess
an ‘‘objective’’ normative status. Even were society to form
an overlapping consensus affirming the rightness of
slavery, society would be wrong. The intrinsic value of
personal freedom tenders a non-relative claim.
Many if not all of our important values are dependent
ultimately on higher-order values that are intrinsic in this
sense. One may value wealth partly because one values the
capacity to be charitable (i.e., to display beneficence).
Beneficence itself, however, need not be derived from
some other value. It can stand on its own two feet.
Accordingly, we define an Intrinsic Value as a form of value
whose worth does not depend on its ability to achieve
other Positive Values. It is non-derivative. Moreover, in a
world where others call us to account for our conduct, an
intrinsic value can serve as a primary justification for
behavior. Understandable as a good reason for any person,
it constitutes a final reason for acting.
Both intrinsic and non-intrinsic values can be under-
stood in two different ways, ways that correspond roughly
to reasons that concern goods and reasons that concern
principles. A person may act for the sake of either ‘‘having a
good’’ or for the sake of a ‘‘principle.’’ Rawls’s (1971)
‘‘primary goods’’ (i.e., those ‘‘things that every rational man
is presumed to want’’) count as reasons in the former
category. However, an alternate way to speak about
intrinsic values is in the form of principles. A person
may act for the sake of a moral principle such as
beneficence, integrity, or promise keeping.
One might challenge the idea of intrinsic values by saying,
‘‘Show me a definitive list of intrinsic values!’’ Philosophers
have constructed and defended many such lists over the
years. Two of the best known are W.D. Ross’s list of ‘‘Prima
Facie Duties’’ (Ross, 1930) and William Frankena’s list of
‘‘intrinsic goods’’ (Frankena, 1973). Frankena’s long list
includes such values as cooperation, experiences of achieve-
ment, self-expression, freedom, peace, security, adventure,
and novelty (Frankena, 1973, pp. 87–88).9 Of course, people
investigate these lists to see if they are in fact, intrinsic. Some
wonder if all such intrinsic goods can be subsumed under a
single overarching intrinsic value or failing that, rank-
ordered. This question has been debated for hundreds of
years. Adam Smith (1759/1981), for example, argued that
the most important human value is beneficence. Immanuel
Kant (1959: 11) later identified ‘‘a good will’’ as the
overarching value: ‘‘Nothing in the world – indeed nothing
even beyond the world – can possibly be conceived which
could be called good without qualification except a good
will.’’ John Stuart Mill (2001) later argued that happiness is
that single overarching intrinsic value. As we noted above,
Jones and Felps (2013a; 2013b) recently introduced this
view to the contemporary world of corporate governance.
Interesting as it may be, we do not need to resolve this
debate here. We simply point out that intrinsic values exist.
As we will see, this fact is essential to any theory of business.
Benefit
Benefit represents the contributions made by Business
to the satisfaction of a Business Participant’s Values,
including his or her Intrinsic Values. Because excellent
production in a cooperative context (Business) is marked
by the efficient production of goods and services, it follows
that the values likely to be fulfilled in business are those
best served by the functions of production and exchange.
Such values include physical security, healthcare, personal
freedom, family support, education, and charity. Indeed,
while the methodological and econometric challenges are
many, the current evidence seems to suggest that there is a
positive relationship between wealth (looking at both GDP
per capita and household income) and reported measures
of well-being. The well-being measures are very abstract.
Diener, Tay, and Oishi (2013, p. 269) and Sacks, Stevenson,
and Wolfers (2012, p. 1182), for example, both looked at
evidence from the Gallup World Poll, where respondents
appraised their lives on an 11-point scale. Their assess-
ments ranged from zero (worst possible life) to ten (best
possible life). Future work will no doubt examine much
more fine-grained measures of well-being. That said, we
imagine that some values are difficult to serve through the
9 Psychologists also pursue this quest. Rokeach (1973), an eminent
social psychologist, developed a value survey comprising 18 terminal
values (identifying desirable end-states) and 18 instrumental values
(identifying desirable means to those ends). The former include such
values as a world at peace, family security, and freedom; the latter include
such values as being honest, ambitious, and responsible). Identifying ten
broad human values, Schwartz (2006) has worked hard to assess their
universality.
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production function. Love, community, virtue, self-control,
integrity, friendship, self-respect, lack of prejudice, and
spontaneity come to mind.
Finally, the word ‘‘satisfaction’’ in our definition needs
some attention. Satisfaction itself has specific character-
istics. First, the satisfaction of a particular value refers to
the satisfaction of that value for a particular Business
Participant. Second, satisfaction admits degrees. Any
person’s particular value may be more or less satisfied.
Third, satisfaction itself can be a paradox. There may be
limits to satisfaction. More satisfaction may not always be
satisfying.10 And fourth, some values are more important
to one person than another. This fact becomes important
when we consider the nature of Collective Value.
Collective value
We stated earlier that Collective Value is the agglom-
eration of the Business Participants’ Benefits, net of any
aversive Business outcomes. While the meaning of that
sentence is clear, the ability to assess that statement in
practice is anything but clear. Einstein reportedly said,
‘‘Not everything that counts can be counted, and not
everything that can be counted counts.’’ Not all Benefits
can be easily appraised, much less combined in a fashion
that allows for easy summation and comparison. The
satisfaction of a set of values for an individual person, not
to mention a group of people, is impossible to measure
accurately on a simple numerical continuum. The chief
problem is incommensurability. For example, how are we
to compare Jack’s utility or happiness to Jill’s (Hausman,
2013)?
Note that we use the word agglomeration and not
aggregation in our definition here. Both words refer to a
clustering but their ultimate coherence differs. Merriam
Webster defines an agglomerate as a mass that is
‘‘clustered or growing together but not coherent;’’ the
dictionary defines an aggregate as ‘‘a mass or body of units
or parts somewhat loosely associated with one another.’’
Collective Value represents an agglomeration of benefits,
not an aggregation of benefits. To illustrate, consider the
value expressed by a human right, say, the right to religious
freedom. This is significantly different from the value
expressed by beneficence. The former implies a defined
minimum standard of behavior relevant to particular
contexts over which the agent has no control. Beneficence,
in contrast, implies a duty to go above minimum levels of
prescribed behavior. It allows the duty to be exercised
using considerable agent discretion in self-defined con-
texts.11 A person may value religious freedom and
beneficence but it is not at all clear how we might easily
combine the two into a simple summation of benefit.
We should note that while alluring, the logic of neo-
classical economics fails us when we consider Collective
Value. Neo-classical economics inherited its notion of
value from early 19th century utilitarian philosophers,
developing theories of utility that could be easily
mathematicized (Deane, 1978). While the early notion of
‘‘utils’’ (units of utility) was eventually abandoned in favor
of marginal utility, neo-classicists such as Jevons (1871)
adopted value monism and assumed that economic
activity could be subsumed (i.e., aggregated) under the
banner of a single value, happiness. Not so Collective Value.
Those uncomfortable with value monism need to be
comfortable with the consideration of an agglomeration of
multiple values, and multiple values of differing character.
Alas, there is no Esperanto of values.
Acknowledging severe limitations in our ability to
measure Benefit and Collective Value, we hasten to add
that not all is lost. Some states of value satisfaction are
clearly better than others. Phronesis, or practical wisdom,
tells us that this is so (Aristotle, 1962). If values, or bundles
of values, were truly incommensurable, we could not speak
rationally about some all-things-considered value choices
being better or worse than others. Practical wisdom refers
to the ability to make good ‘‘all-things-considered’’
choices, even in multi-valued contexts. Imagine an
employee, Bob, who reasons about whether to choose
job A or job B. Bob thinks: ‘‘In job A, I have a monthly salary
that is $10 higher than in job B, and I am treated with
disrespect and ignominy. In job B, I have a monthly salary
that is $10 lower than in job A, and I am treated with
respect and dignity. I conclude that job B is a better job
than A.’’ Here Bob compares two things that appear to be
incommensurate at first blush, namely, the value of dignity
and the value of money. But Bob reasons well. The
objectivity of Bob’s choice is reflected in the fact that a vast
majority of people would reason in the same way if
confronted with this choice. Neo-classical economists view
human beings as rational economic agents, as Homo
Economicus. We view our fellow men and women as
practical reasoners, as Homo Practicus.
Dignity, the dignity threshold, and business success
If business exists to create collective value, it follows
that any theory of business must be normative. A theory
like this must say something about the world we hope to
inhabit. We need to come to terms with how business
creates value and serves society. Recognizing that aversive
outcomes can attend the conduct of business, we also
recognize that some aversive outcomes are simply out of
bounds. Our challenge as a people is to determine just
what behavior is acceptable and what is unacceptable.
10 In the extreme, the satisfaction of a positive value could even become
problematic. Lewis (2014, pp. 308–309) summed up the phenomenon:
‘‘The more I looked into it the more I came to suspect that I was perceiving
a universal law. On cause mieux quand on ne dit pas Causons. The woman
who makes a dog the centre of her life loses, in the end, not only her
human usefulness and dignity but even the proper pleasure of dog-
keeping. . . .It is a glorious thing to feel for a moment or two that the whole
meaning of the universe is summed up in one woman [or man]—glorious
so long as other duties and pleasures keep tearing you away from her
[him]. But clear the decks and so arrange your life (it is sometimes
feasible) that you will have nothing to do but contemplate her [him], and
what happens? Of course this law has been discovered before, but it will
stand re-discovery. It may be stated as follows: every preference of a
small good to a great, or a partial good to a total good, involves the loss of
the small or partial good for which the sacrifice was made.’’ Contrariwise,
diminished satisfaction can also become satisfying. For example, patients
can come to enjoy the sick role (Mechanic and Volkart, 1961).
11 This illustration captures the distinction between ‘‘perfect’’ vs.
‘‘imperfect’’ duties that we see in moral theory (Kant, 1996).
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In legal terms, we are looking for a moral ‘‘bright line rule,’’
one that tells us what kind of business activity is to be
strictly forbidden (Schlag, 1985). We suggest that at a
minimum, dignity establishes that decision criterion.
The idea of the dignity of the person has deep roots in
moral philosophy and political action. In moral philosophy,
the very possibility of realizing intrinsic values (and of
moral behavior in general) presumes the inherent worth of
actors capable of such achievements. In different ways,
Utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, and Aristotelianism all
affirm the worth of that actor who uniquely possesses the
capacity to achieve the good and the right, namely, the
moral person. Whether grounded in sacred notions of
the divine or secular notions of agency and autonomy;
every individual has what Rosen (2012, pp. 9, 70) calls ‘‘an
inner transcendental kernel of inalienable value.’’12 Kateb
(2011), Lagon and Arend (2014a), Rosen (2012), and
Waldron (2012) all offer contemporary reviews and their
own ideas about the dignity construct. From them, we
learn that dignity carries an action implication. Endowed
with this inner ‘‘transcendental kernel,’’ every individual is
entitled to respect. Indeed, political life is judged by its
affirmation and protection of human dignity.
In 1776, the U.S. Declaration of Independence famously
began with an assertion that ‘‘all men are created equal.’’
All men – and women – are not only created equal, they
must be treated as equals. They must be accorded their
human dignity. Nine years later, Kant (1959, p. 54) cast this
kind of thinking into his categorical imperative. He argued
that we are always to ‘‘act so that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in that of another, always
as an end and never as a means only.’’ This same kind of
thinking was enshrined 163 years later in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Without dissent, the United
Nations General Assembly affirmed a document that
begins with the words:
the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family [; such dignity] is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world.
Germany took this kind of aspirational thinking a step
further the next year. In 1949, they affirmed the
importance of human dignity in Article 1 of the Basic
Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz):
‘‘Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect
it shall be the duty of all state authority.’’13 Theirs is not
just an aspirational statement; it is an enforceable one.14
Thus, human dignity, with roots both in moral theory and
in political action, serves as a central and even sacred
Intrinsic Value to guide Business activity.15
Our understanding of human dignity tells us that our
fellow humans are not to be treated as mere objects or
instruments in a business organization’s production
function. Business participants are to be treated with
respect. As such, the Dignity Threshold establishes a moral
foundation for business activity. The challenge, of course, is
to identify what treatment does or does not clear the
threshold. Since the threshold marks the minimum level of
respect accorded to each Business Participant, the thresh-
old can best be seen as prohibiting indignity. To be sure,
participants can bolster another’s dignity, enhancing
eudaimonia (what the ancients called human flourishing),
but at minimum, Business Participants cannot deny each
other’s fundamental dignity.
Borrowing language from the world of statistics, we can
say that dignity is both a ‘‘categorical’’ and ‘‘continuous’’
idea. When we speak of an indignity, we speak of dignity as
a categorical idea. Hold someone as a slave, for example,
and regardless of how well you might treat that person,
you fully deprive that person of his or her dignity. There is
absolutely no dignity in slavery. Thomas Jefferson may
have fathered six children with Sally Hemings but owning
her as his property until the day he died, he denied her
dignity (Gordon-Reed, 2008). Article 4 of the U.N.
Declaration on Human Rights is unequivocal: ‘‘No one
shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave
trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.’’ The US South in
the first half of the nineteenth century relied upon the
institution of slavery to support its expansive system of
plantation farming. Even if slavery enhanced the GDP or
PPP of the region, plantation farming cannot be considered
Business Success. Slavery stripped its captive people of
their dignity. The institution of slavery simply does not
pass the Dignity Threshold. That fact cannot be offset at a
personal level by seemingly decent interpersonal treat-
ment. The theory of business offered here directs and
justifies every effort to dismantle a business system that
so violates human dignity.
With eudaimonia in mind, we can see too that dignity
exists on a continuum. The absence of indignity does not
fully capture what is means to be treated with dignity and
to flourish. Consider how we produce and distribute the
food we need to survive and thrive. With the idea of human
dignity front of mind, Article 25 of the U.N. Declaration of
Human Rights states:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate
for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to
security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
12 Of course, some deny others their inalienable value. Tyrants, for
example, may deny an entire ethnic group their value and upon doing so,
unleash all manner of horrors upon them (Dean, 2002; Hintjens, 1999).
13 See hhttp://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/eng-
lisch_gg.html#p0015i for look at this law.
14 See Lepsius (2006) for an intriguing case in the Germany’s Federal
Constitutional Court. The court weighed the dignity and lives of
passengers on an airplane commandeered by terrorists against the
dignity and lives of the citizens below whom the terrorists intend to kill
with that plane. The decision surprised many observers. The innocent
people on the doomed aircraft cannot be killed in an effort to protect the
people on the ground.
15 Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner (2000, p. 853) define a sacred
value as ‘‘any value that a moral community implicitly or explicitly treats
as possessing infinite or transcendental significance and that precludes
comparison, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or
secular values.’’ Harrison, Ashforth and Corley (2009, p. 244) point out, ‘‘to
sacralize is to render inviolable, such that even contemplating a violation
of the sacred is an act of sacrilege.’’
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disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
Gendered language aside, the key word here is
‘‘adequate.’’ The World Health Organization tells us that
a healthy diet consists of ‘‘fruits, vegetables, legumes (e.g.
lentils, beans), nuts, and whole grains (e.g. unprocessed
maize, millet, oats, wheat, brown rice).’’ Some may rarely
eat fruits or say vegetables, but regularly eat all else. Is that
to be considered an adequate diet? Others may be
chronically short of many of these diverse foodstuffs and
be formally labeled as undernourished (the United
Nation’s World Food Programme tells us that about one
in nine, or 795 million people in the world today are
undernourished).16 A healthy diet can be thought of in
categorical terms (Is a person undernourished or not?) or
in continuous terms (What is the quality of a person’s
nutrition?). What is the difference between an ‘‘inade-
quate’’ diet, an ‘‘adequate’’ diet, a ‘‘good’’ diet, and an
‘‘excellent’’ diet? That question is born of a ‘‘continuous’’
understanding of nutrition. To ask whether a person has an
adequate diet is to ask ‘‘how low we can go’’ before we rob
a person of his or her dignity; to ask whether a person has
an excellent diet is to ask ‘‘how high we can fly’’ as we
embrace a person’s dignity.
Some may argue over where to draw a line that
establishes the criterion for proper nutrition – or clothing,
housing, medical care, social services and the right to
security, or for that matter, the many complex interactions
between and among the access to nutrition, clothing,
housing, medical care, social services, and security.
Arguments about measurement and demarcation do not
undermine the ideas we share here. In fact, we welcome
them. We can do worse as a people if we agree to prohibit
indignities in the world and then debate the essence of the
dignity we owe each other.
Looking to Article 25 for help in understanding the
nature of dignity, we should point out that we are not
arguing here for the corporation or business to cloth the
naked and feed the hungry. Direct responsibilities fall
clearly on governments and individuals. Nevertheless, as
many have argued, business cannot duck responsibilities
to respect, protect and sometimes remedy and violations of
basic human rights (Donaldson, 1989, pp. 65–94; Ruggie,
2008).
Writing about the nature of society, Margalit (1996, pp.
10–11) observed, ‘‘A society is decent if its institutions do
not act in ways that give the people under their authority
sound reasons to consider themselves humiliated.’’
Expanding on Margalit’s notion, we would say, ‘‘Business
is decent if its institutions do not act in ways that give the
people under their authority sound reasons to think their
inherent worth has been denied.’’ Beyond that, if business
is to be considered successful, collective value must be
optimized, enhanced as much as possible. That optimiza-
tion process must include the recognition of participants’
dignity. Rosen (2012, p. 157) got it right when he said,
‘‘In failing to respect the humanity of others we actually
undermine humanity in ourselves.’’17
Next, we consider a more complex contemporary
business situation that illustrates how purely economic
notions of business success can fail us.
Collective value in the world of coffee
Let us consider a stylized, but not unimaginable case.
Consider a simplified value chain for the production of
coffee, one that includes the relationships among the
farmer, the roaster, and the retailer [see Ponte (2002) for a
more complete examination of coffee’s value chain]. In this
world, the farmer grows the coffee beans; he or she then
sells them to the roaster, who in turn, sells the roasted
beans to the retailer. The retailer, of course, sells the
beverage to the consumer. For purposes of simplicity, we
assume a world comprised of one farmer, one roaster, and
one retailer.
In this simple value chain, we clearly find activity that
fits our definition of business activity, namely, cooperation
involving the production, exchange, and distribution of
goods and services (albeit one without a consideration of
the government and not-for-profit sector). How do we
assess Collective Value here? We know that Collective
Value in the value chain equals the agglomeration of the
Business Participants’ benefits [i.e., the benefits that accrue
to the farmer, the roaster and the retailer], net of any
aversive business outcomes. Because Benefits equal the
contributions made to the satisfaction of a Business
Participant’s Positive and Intrinsic Values, it follows that
we must also assess the satisfaction of their values.
Let us consider first Intrinsic Values in agglomerating
the satisfaction of these participants’ values. Again,
Intrinsic Values can be divided into two types: good-
related and principle-related. For the purposes of simplici-
ty, we identify only one good-related value here, health,
and only one principle-related value, promise keeping.18
We assume that both of these intrinsic values are positive
values for the farmer, roaster, and retailer. In agglomerat-
ing the satisfaction of their values, next consider non-
intrinsic values. For simplicity’s sake, we identify only
three non-intrinsic values. Each participant has his or her
own idiosyncratic value: the farmer wants to build his or
her businesses, the roaster wants to better educate his or
her children, and the retailer wants to improve his or her
means of personal transportation.
We will consider three possible configurations of
Collective Value: Optimized Collective Value (or Business
16 See hhttp://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs394/en/i and
hhttps://www.wfp.org/hunger/statsi for links to the work of the WHO
and the WFP.
17 It is not always easy to recognize another’s dignity. Molinsky and
Margolis (2005), for example, alerted us to the challenge of administering
a ‘‘necessary evil’’ to another. They pointed out that there are times when
‘‘an individual causes emotional or physical harm to another human
being in the service of achieving some perceived greater good or purpose’’
(p. 247). Still, Margolis and Molinsky (2008, p. 858) showed us that these
evils can be administered with ‘‘respect, dignity, empathy, and concern.’’
18 While human dignity is the paramount intrinsic value in our work,
promise keeping deserves special treatment too. Promises seal contracts,
a sine qua non for Business activity. It is no surprise to see that agency
theory and transaction cost economics both turn on the concept of
contract.
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Success), Unsavory Business Practices, and the Exploitation
of Advantage. For purposes of simplicity, we assume that
the values at stake here are either fully satisfied or not
satisfied. A plus sign expresses the satisfaction of a given
value; a negative sign expresses the failure to satisfy a
given value (we do not attempt to weigh the different
values or to assign a rank ordering here).
First, imagine a simple configuration of Business
Success (i.e., proximity to optimized Collective Value). In
this configuration, the business activities of the value chain
satisfy all intrinsic and selected non-intrinsic values for
the farmer, roaster, and retailer (see Table 1). Everyone
receives enough from their business activities to ensure
their adequate health. Moreover, promises among the
three are kept (honoring their business contracts and
quality commitments). Next, the non-intrinsic values are
satisfied, one for each of the Business Participants. The
farmer earns enough money to buy more land, the roaster
is able to send his or her children to private school, and the
retailer is able to purchase a modest automobile, say a Kia
Rio. Each row expresses the Benefit to each participant. The
matrix itself represents the agglomeration of the individ-
ual benefits, the Collective Value of Business in this stylized
world of business.
Imagine next a different state, one called Unsavory
Business Practices (see Table 2). Here the intrinsic value of
promise keeping is not satisfied but the intrinsic value of
health is satisfied. Suppose, for example, that despite
persistent lying and broken commitments all around, the
productive capacity of the value chain is sufficient to
satisfy all other values, including the participants’ health.
Despite productive abundance, something is missing in
this world of business. The Collective Value matrix is not
optimized. Most people prefer to live in a world of kept
promises. This inferiority of this ‘‘all things considered’’
world of business, one reflecting a violation of intrinsic
values, is difficult to depict accurately using traditional
economic methods. ‘‘Objective values,’’ at the very mini-
mum, constitute constraints on the ‘‘skeletal view of
rationality espoused by economists’’ (Hausman & McPher-
son, 1993, p. 683). Deontological concepts that reference
commitments and obligations are needed; and these can
conflict with economic concepts of well-being. ‘‘Some
types of agency roles, e.g., those related to fulfilling
obligations,’’ writes Sen (1985, p. 187), ‘‘can quite possibly
have a negative impact on the person’s well-being.’’
Finally, let us consider a configuration called the
Exploitation of Advantage (see Table 3). Here one actor’s
pursuit of an idiosyncratic value undermines another
actor’s fundamental intrinsic value and his or her
idiosyncratic value. Imagine a world where the retailer
claims most of the value simply because he or she can.
Intrinsic Values met, he or she is also able to grandly satisfy
his or her idiosyncratic value by purchasing a conspicu-
ously luxurious mode of transportation. The roaster’s place
in the value chain is secure; he or she neither gains nor
loses by the change of affairs. The farmer, however, now
lives in a world of life-threatening poverty. His or her
intrinsic value of health is no longer satisfied as low prices
create a life of desperate poverty. He or she then moves to
supplement the coffee crop with opium or khat in a
desperate effort to earn enough money to eat (Khat tops
coffee for Ethiopia farmers, 2014; Myanmar returns to
what sells: Heroin, 2015). Such an imagined world may not
be too far removed from today’s actual world of coffee
production and consumption (Haight, 2011; Ponte, 2002;
Valkila, Haaparanta, & Niemi, 2010). The acclaimed
2006 documentary film entitled ‘‘Black Gold’’ captures
something of this life.19
Of course, this simple three-actor model does not
account for the problem of externalities. That said, it is easy
enough to illustrate the externality problem in this kind of
world. All we need to do is play out the success story
pictured in Table 1. Problems arise when farmers, moving
to satisfy consumer demand, move their now industrial-
based farming practices from the shade to the sun. Nearly
twenty years ago, Perfecto, Rice, Greenberg and van der
Voort (1996, p. 607) warned of a ‘‘severe loss of
biodiversity’’ if coffee farmers continued to move their
operations into the sunshine. Jha et al. (2014) recently told
us that in a world where we now drink more than
400 billion cups of coffee annually, perhaps only a quarter
of the world’s coffee is grown traditionally, in the shade.
They chronicle the deleterious effects of sun-grown coffee
practices on the likes of pollination, pest control, carbon
sequestration, soil quality, erosion control, and watershed
management. Grim as the situation is, Tscharntke et al.
(2011) do offer a host of ideas to reverse the situation.
Nevertheless, unless checked, ‘‘successful’’ coffee farming
can create problems for us all.
As the above analyses show, Business Success names a
concept richer than one focusing solely on the mere
aggregation of economic wealth. True business success
should be able to show, as this model does, why the first
configuration is superior to the other two (albeit with a
clear eye on how that success might affect the natural
environment in the years ahead). Our conception of
business merges values that are not expressly contem-
plated in economic theory with ones that are. Simple
Table 1
Business success: the participants’ intrinsic and idiosyncratic values are satisfied.
Enterprise Intrinsic
value 1—Health
Intrinsic
value 2—Promise
keeping
Positive
value 1—Build
a business
Positive
value 2—Better
educate our children
Positive
value 3—Improve
personal transportation
Coffee farmer + + Buys more land (+)
Coffee roaster + + Pays private school tuition (+)
Coffee retailer + + Buys a Kia Rio (+)
19 See hhttp://blackgoldmovie.com/i for a link to the movie.
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economic thinking contemplates the values of subjective
personal preference (e.g., property and financial well-
being) but not one’s intrinsic values (e.g., human dignity
and promise keeping). To be sure, economic thinking does
not expressly dismiss such values; the values simply fall
outside the circumscribed domain of economic theory. As
Sandel (2012, 2013) recently observed, a preoccupation
with a narrow set of values will have the cumulative effect
of crowding out consideration of the kinds of intrinsic
values we consider here.
Implications
The purpose, accountability, control, and success of business
We opened this work by chronicling the normative
pressure on firms to serve as agents of world benefit. Those
who encourage businesses to change (e.g., the United
Nations and the Aspen Institute) are not marked by a lack
of economic sophistication but rather by a quest to honor
human dignity when we produce, exchange, and distribute
our goods and services. This quest inspired our attempt to
develop a theory of business.
To be sure, our theory is a normative one. Looking to
articulate the role that business plays in creating a good
society, it cannot be otherwise. Freeman (1994) is correct.
The separation thesis is false. Any attempt to separate
business activity from values is akin to trying to separate a
vase from its shape. The same is true of business. It is
impossible to jettison values from a comprehensive
consideration of business practice. Business activity
always reveals the values that shape it. Those values are
revealed in any consideration of the purpose, accountabil-
ity, control, and success of business. As such, we offer the
following four propositions as corollaries to a theory of
business:
 P1: The purpose of business is to optimize collective
value.
 P2: Business is accountable to those who affect and are
affected by its activities, those in the present, past, and
future.
 P3: Business control must prohibit any assault on
participants’ dignity.
 P4: Optimized collective value is the mark of business
success.
Three noteworthy features mark these propositions.
First, we need to consider the idea of equifinality. There are
many paths to business success. Second, the idea that
business is accountable to business participants in the past
and future, as well as to those in the present, is worthy of
discussion. And finally, we need to say a word about
optimization in this context.
Equifinality
One important implication of these propositions is that
not all business firms need to be alike. In fact, a variety of
organizations will likely achieve collective value better
than a set of firms marked by cookie–cutter similarity.
Consider an analogy. A coordinated team of carpenters,
electricians, plumbers, masons and the like will build a
better home than any one group will build on its own (or
even one made by a Jack-of-all-trades artisan). And of
course, it takes more than craftspeople to build a building.
Bankers, lawyers and insurance specialists, for example,
enable this work too. The second implication is that the
work of business needs to be coordinated. To be sure,
markets facilitate coordination but those markets them-
selves need to be developed and sustained. Government
and the not-for-profit sector play crucial roles in business
too. In addition to providing the infrastructure for efficient
and effective contracting among the parties, government
ensures the quality of building materials, the well-being of
the natural environment, the safety of the builders, and so
much more. The not-for-profit sector works to both ensure
that standards and safeguards of all kinds are defined and
met, often before any government is involved (e.g., the
National Fire Protection Association), and to make sure
Table 2
Suboptimal collective value: unsavory business practices (while one of participants’ intrinsic values and all of their idiosyncratic values are met, one
intrinsic value is violated).
Enterprise Intrinsic
value 1—Health
Intrinsic
value 2—Promise
keeping
Positive
value 1—Build
a business
Positive
value 2—Better
educate our children
Positive
value 3—Improve
personal transportation
Coffee farmer + Lying and broken promises () Buys more land (+)
Coffee roaster + Lying and broken promises () Pays private school
tuition (+)
Coffee retailer + Lying and broken promises () Buys a Kia Rio (+)
Table 3
Exploitation of advantage: one participant’s pursuit of an idiosyncratic value undermines another’s fundamental intrinsic and idiosyncratic value.
Enterprise Intrinsic
value 1—Health
Intrinsic
value 2—Promise
keeping
Positive
value 1—Build
a business
Positive
value 2—Better
educate our children
Positive
value 3—Improve
personal transportation
Coffee farmer Living in poverty () + Now grows
narcotics ()
Coffee roaster + + Pays private school
tuition (+)
Coffee retailer + + Buys a Cadillac Escalade (+)
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that society’s needs are addressed (e.g., Habitat for
Humanity). Any single business firm always sits in a
broader ecology of business activity. The amazing, and
nearly infinite, variety of firms and coordination schemes
available for achieving Business Success opens the door to
equifinality. Many roads can lead to the same destination.
Accountability to the past and future, as well as to the present
Business participants are accountable not just to their
contemporaries but to their ancestors and descendants
too. That statement might strike some as very expansive, if
not too expansive. To assert that business is to be
accountable to those living who affect and are affected
by its activity should pass without remark. To be sure,
people read Freeman’s (1984, p. 46) definition of a
stakeholder (‘‘any group or individual who can affect or
is affected by the achievement of the activities of an
organization’’) and wonder whether a firm should really
view a competitor or even a terrorist as a stakeholder
(Phillips, 2003). Still, no one questions Freeman’s implicit
focus on the living.
A move to consider the unborn might raise an eyebrow
at first blush, but with some reflection, we see that people
do accept the idea. After all, future thinking is baked
into our everyday conceptions of management. Jacques
(1986), for example, noted that a firm’s senior leaders
typically look twenty to fifty years into the future when
they make their decisions. More recently, Elkington
(1998, p. 55) famously defined sustainability as ‘‘meeting
the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs‘‘.
Legacy matters. Indeed, a number of social psychologists
are working today to understand just how people make
forward-looking intergeneration resource allocation
decisions (Tost, Wade-Benzoni, & Johnson, 2015; Wade-
Benzoni, 2002; Wade-Benzoni, Hernandez, Medvec, &
Messick, 2008; Wade-Benzoni, Sondak, & Galinsky, 2010).
However, people may not think about their predeces-
sors’ legacies. Do we owe anything to those who came
before us? We say ‘‘yes.’’ The humility that comes from an
understanding of history does us good. Fundamentally, we
need to appreciate that we inherit the world when we are
born. We also would do well to appreciate that in time, our
lives will be history too. Our legacy should be to leave the
world better than we found it. In short, we should work to
make our ancestors proud. In this spirit, Wade-Benzoni
(2002, p. 1014) introduced us to the idea of intergenera-
tional reciprocity. She argued, ‘‘people can pass on benefits
(or burdens) to future generations as a matter of
retrospective obligation (or retaliation) for the good (or
bad) received from past generations’’ (p. 1014). Note that
with a focus on all that is received (the good and the bad in
her terms) – this is a descriptive theoretical idea.
Normatively, we would do well to learn from the bad
we inherit but resist the temptation to settle scores. All too
often, retribution creates never-ending cycles of violence
(Minow, 2002). It is much better to build on the good than
it is to be caught up in the bad.
Mkhize (2004) tells us that many in Africa see
themselves as interdependently linked to the past. People
there strive to honor the best of their ancestors’ legacies.
Such a view is less common in the global North. South or
North, business leaders the world over would do well to
consider how their decisions do – or do not – honor their
ancestors’ positive contributions to their lives.20 Stewards
for the world in our time here, we should work to honor
our grandparents’ contributions in the same way that we
hope our grandchildren will work to honor ours. Taking
stock of our recent financial crisis, Bruce Springsteen
(Stewart, 2012, p. 45) lambasted those without such a
sensibility:
This is what the guys at Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers forgot. They forgot that they are a part of a
continuum of history, and it’s not about the fucking
buck that you make today at whoever’s fucking
expense. If there’s not a sense of continuity, a sense
of some sort of communal obligation and responsibility,
a sense of a future involved in what you’re doing, and a
sense of being beholden to the past, you end up being
one callow, greedy motherfucker, just trying to get all
you can get.
Optimization
We recognize that some may question our idea that
optimized collective value is the mark of business success.
They might argue that just as economists problematically
assumed (for decades) that humans are perfectly rational
and work to optimize their economic ambitions, we might
have embraced a similarly problematic idea. Adopting the
idea of optimization as we do, we risk a reader dismissing
our ideas of success as fantasy. Perhaps we should follow
Simon’s (1945/1997) lead and develop an idea akin to his
notion of satisficing. Perhaps we should develop a
threshold notion of ‘‘satisfactory collective value’’ and
use it instead to define business success. There is much to
be said about that kind of a well-meaning reaction. At base,
however, we think it is a mistake to introduce a ‘‘good
enough ‘‘criterion to any consideration of business success.
Merriam Webster tells us that optimization is ‘‘an act,
process, or methodology of making something (as a design,
system, or decision) as fully perfect, functional, or effective
as possible.’’ We do well to strive for business success that
is as fully perfect, functional, or effective as possible. Why
should we settle for anything less?
Remember that Herbert Simon’s problem is not our
problem. Simon (1978, p. 368) addressed the problem
facing (what he called in his Nobel Prize acceptance
speech) the ‘‘information processing system called Man.’’
He investigated how individuals with limited information
processing capabilities make decisions and solve problems
in the face of incredible complexity and uncertainty. Faced
with cognitive limitations, he argued that individuals
20 A friendly reviewer asked if by turning to African society for
inspiration, we risk dismissal by those who think ‘‘pre-modern’’ societies
have little to teach us. We hold no such prejudice. Indeed, we are wary of
those in the global north who think they are somehow more modern than
those in the global south. History does not look kindly on such a view. To
put it mildly, the people of the Congo, for example, were not impressed by
the ‘‘modern ways’’ shown them by the Belgians at the turn of the last
century (Hochschild, 1998).
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operate with bounded rationality and satisfice, often
finding ‘‘ways of action that are sufficient unto the day’’
(1978, p. 368). We are not searching for a descriptive
theory of sufficient business behavior here. Rather, we are
searching for a normative theory of business that will
enable us to flourish as a species in the world. We owe it to
our ancestors, ourselves, and to our descendants to strive
for optimized collective value. Work for anything less and
we will very likely get it.
Beware a fallacy of division
The fallacy of division is the converse of the fallacy of
composition. We commit it when we imagine that the
properties of a whole are fully transferable to its parts.
Recalling Hansen’s (2015, p. 5) example, one cannot
observe an excellent investigative team and infer that
each member of the team is an excellent researcher. As
Durkheim (1895/1966, p. 4) pointed out years ago in his
discussion of social facts, ‘‘there are ways of acting,
thinking and feeling that present the noteworthy property
of existing outside the individual consciousness.’’ A team
has properties that go beyond its membership, just as
business has properties that differ from the firms that help
comprise it.
The 2004 United States presidential election offers us a
classic example of a division fallacy. While John Kerry won
the popular vote in 9 of the country’s 11 wealthiest states
and George Bush won the 15 poorest states, we cannot
conclude that rich people voted for Kerry and poor people
voted for Bush. In fact, 62% of voters with annual incomes
over $200,000 voted for Bush and 64% of voters with
annual income less than $15,000 voted for Kerry (Gelman,
2010). The fallacy here is to assume that the action of a
wealthy state (the whole) can easily tell us about the
behavior of the individuals in the state (the parts).
Accordingly, we need to consider carefully what a theory
of business implies for any single business firm. Instead of
drawing inferences directly from our broader theory of
business to any single firm, we should ask whether what is
true at the level of business as a whole is compatible with
what is true at the level of the firm. A number of open
questions about such compatibility emerge when we
juxtapose a theory of business with a theory of the firm.
Table 4 briefly contrasts the two perspectives and then
raises a series of open questions for us to consider.
These questions open a new door to appraising and
leading firms. They may also help to explain the uneasiness
we catalogued at the start of this paper. Consider, for
example, the beleaguered straw man, specifically the idea
that firms are to reduce their transaction costs. Despite its
critics (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996), some scholars took the
occasion of Oliver Williamson’s 2009 Nobel Prize an-
nouncement to reflect on the theory’s contribution to the
theory and practice of management (Teece, 2010), strate-
gic management (Nickerson, 2010), international business
(Hennart, 2010), and marketing (John & Reve, 2010). Many
argue that transaction cost theory has yielded helpful
insights to improve the efficiency of production and
exchange and, in turn, generate collective value. However,
the theory’s inability to address such issues as the
obligation of the banking industry to avoid the systemic
financial risks that can imperil the industry and society
alike should surprise no one.
To be sure, the fact that these issues fall outside the
reach of the transaction cost theory is not a failing of
the theory per se. As Alfred North Whitehead (1978, p. 9)
once noted, ‘‘The field of a special science is confined to
one genus of facts, in the sense that no statements are
made respecting facts which lie outside that genus.’’ The
relevant theory for addressing such a concern is not
transaction cost economics but rather a theory of
business. Bank executives, for example, should ask,
‘‘Because the integrity of the financial environment is
crucial for optimizing collective value, has our bank
defined its purpose, understood its accountability, and
designed its control systems in such a way that our
activities are compatible with maintaining the integrity of
the financial system?’’ Depending on circumstance, the
same executives might follow with corollary questions,
such as, ‘‘Might our need for collective value require a new
approach for understanding competition and cooperation
in our industry? Should we, for example, initiate industry-
level conversations and even collaborations on how best
to avoid systemic risk and protect the integrity of the
global financial system?’’ After all, self-regulation is not
unknown in the corporate world (Haufler, 2001). With this
framing and example as backdrop, we will close our paper
Table 4
Open questions: contrasting a theory of business with a theory of the firm.
Theory of business Neo-classical theories
of the firm
Open questions for corporate leaders
Purpose Optimize collective value Maximize firm value Is our corporation’s purpose compatible with Business
achieving Optimized Collective Value for all Business
Participants?
Accountability To all Business Participants To the law and to the
firm’s owners
Is our form of corporate accountability compatible with
Business achieving Optimized Collective Value for all
Business Participants?
Control Prohibit assaults on
participants’ dignity
Guard against self-seeking
with guile
Is our form of corporate control compatible with Business
achieving Optimized Collective Value for all Business
Participants?
Success Optimized collective value Shareholder wealth creation Is the form of our corporation’s success compatible with
Business achieving Optimized Collective Value for all
Business Participants?
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with a consideration of some issues that might bedevil us
in the years ahead.
Purpose
What is the purpose of a firm when the purpose of
business is to optimize collective value? One might be
tempted to reason that every firm must simply work to
optimize collective value. This view, however, would
evidence another instance of the division fallacy. Consider
the human heart. The purpose of the heart is to pump
blood. However, it is important to note that different parts
of the heart, the ventricles, valves, septum, aorta and more,
have their own discrete purposes. Now consider business.
Just as the septum is a part of the heart that pumps blood, a
firm is a part of the ecology of business that creates
collective value. Few firms may be entirely focused on
creating collective value. And that is fine. Still, they are not
exempt from playing some role in that effort. After all, a
firm is a moral entity that works in and for society. As such,
a firm holds two interrelated purposes: first, a focal
purpose, a purpose that reflects its work in society and
second, a contextual purpose, a purpose that reflects its
work for society.
The firm’s focal purpose is familiar to every business
student. Fail to provide customers with a high quality good
or service at a competitive, profit-making price and the
firm may well go out of business. Fail to reach those
customers with an effective sales and marketing campaign,
raise and manage capital, recruit and manage human
resources, and efficiently manage their operations and the
firm may go out of business. And to be sure, managers
cannot ignore those who hold the firm’s residual claims,
those who hold common stock. The neoclassical econo-
mists persuasively point out that these risk-bearing
shareholders are the ones most interested in maximizing
the value of the entire corporation. Shareholders can keep
managers ever attentive to creating sustained competitive
advantage.
All of that said, the firm’s contextual purpose cannot be
ignored. A firm is a human creation, one designed by
humans and for humans. At a minimum, all of its activities
must clear the Dignity Threshold. No firm should disre-
spect the inherent worth, the dignity, of its many business
participants. It must treat each one with respect. Moreover,
no firm should forget that the final justification of its
activities from a social perspective lies in its contribution
to collective value.
Many firms are experimenting with aligning focal and
contextual purposes in explicit ways. Indeed, such
dedicated dual-purpose experimentation marks our age.
Some firms, obeying the law, seek to maximize their
shareholder’s return. No one can complain about such
firms if they clear the Dignity Threshold and recognize
their broader purpose in society. Others, however, seek to
make a more direct social impact as they conduct their
business. Looking at what Conley and Williams (2005)
called the ‘‘corporate social responsibility movement,’’ we
increasingly see firms making social investments of the
kind Kofi Annan (2001) sought almost fifteen years ago.
Others firms, LinkedIn for example, have a mission infused
with social purpose. Their mission is to ‘‘connect the
world’s professionals to make them more productive and
successful’’; their purpose is a lofty one – to ‘‘creat(e)
economic opportunity for every member of the global
workforce.’’21 Others, B Corporations, submit themselves
to outside appraisal and are formally certified as commit-
ted to transparent social and environmental performance
(as they do their business). Nearly 1400 B Corps in
41 countries have been so certified as of this writing.22 And
still others, social enterprises, commit themselves to social
and economic performance but do so absent third party
certification (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Ebrahim, Battilana,
& Mair, 2014).
Perhaps surprisingly, those steeped in neo-classical
economics are not hostile to such experimentation. The
noted legal scholars Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), for
example, addressed this issue directly. All they request is
transparency:
What is the goal of the corporation? Is it profit, and for
whom? Is there anything wrong with company charity?
Should corporations try to maximize profit over the
long run or short run? Our response to such questions
is: who cares? If the New York Times is formed to publish
a newspaper first and make a profit second, no one
should be allowed to object. Those who came in at the
beginning consented, and those who came later bought
stock the price of which reflected the corporation’s
tempered commitment to a profit objective. . . .one
thing that cannot survive is systematic efforts to fool
participants (pp. 35–37).
Just as a firm ought not to fool its shareholders, it ought
not to fool any of its business participants. It is incumbent
on a firm to be clear about it purpose and its effects on
others. It is to be accountable to every business participant.
Accountability
We argued earlier that Business Participants must be
accountable to others, even those from the past and in the
future. Complex as that assertion may be, business leaders
face another accountability challenge. Responsible for a set
of processes and practices that quite clearly affect life on
the planet, we need to consider other life on the planet.
Humans share the earth with other animals, plants, and
yes, the physical planet itself. Is business accountable to
anyone or anything besides our human beings? We say
yes. While we defined dignity in terms of the inherent
worth of persons, we now wonder if non-human animals
manifest any kind of dignity. Indeed, might other parts of
the biosphere, forests, grasslands and coral reefs, possess
their own singular form of inherent worth? We think the
answer to both questions is yes, although we acknowledge
the difficulty of justifying this ‘‘yes.’’ A full justification lies
beyond this paper’s reach.
Still, take the animal kingdom. To be sure, animals may
lack the ability to reason in complex ways; their lives are
21 See hhttps://www.linkedin.com/about-us?trk=hb_ft_abouti for a look
at their mission and hhttps://linkedinforgood.linkedin.com/i for a look at
their purpose.
22 See hhttps://www.bcorporation.net/i for a current figure.
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more tightly bound to the pursuit of simple interests such
as food and survival than humans lives are. The theme of
the inferiority of animals to humans is ubiquitous in
history. Genesis portrays God as saying, ‘‘Have dominion
over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and all the living
things that crawl on the earth.’’ While these crawling living
things may have simple interests, they nonetheless do
have interests. And the satisfaction or denial of these
interests, just as in the case of humans, creates both
benefits and harms. Peter Singer, the philosopher best
known for championing the rights of animals writes, ‘‘The
argument for extending the principle of equality beyond
our own species is simple. It amounts to no more than a
clear understanding of the principle of equal consideration
of interests’’ (Singer, 2011, p. 49). In his sweeping history of
the human species, Harari (2015, p. 92) suggests that we
should be ashamed by how we have handled our
responsibility to the animal kingdom: ‘‘Ten thousand
years ago, not more than a few million sheep, cattle, goats,
boars and chickens lived in restricted Afro-Asian niches.
Today the world contains about a billion sheep, a billion
pigs, more than a billion cattle, and more than 25 billion
chickens. . . .domesticated chickens and cattle may well be
an evolutionary success story, but they are also among the
most miserable creatures that ever lived. The domestica-
tion of animals was founded on a series of brutal practices
that only became crueler with the passing of the
centuries.’’23
Hence, one might apply a version of the Dignity
Threshold to the treatment of animals based on the simple
analogy between human and animal interests Indeed,
Grandine and Deesing (2008) show us how we can treat
animals with dignity, even as we raise them to eat.
No shortage of critics, prophets, and problem solvers
work to alert us humans to our treatment of the earth itself.
Founded in 1974, the Worldwatch Institute has been
publishing its influential State of the World reports
annually since 1984. Born in 2000 at Kofi Annan’s urging,
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment project works with
scientists the world over to assess changes in our
ecosystems and their effects on human well-being. They
also imagine solutions to our problems. Recently, Pope
Francis added his voice of concern, calling the world to
action with the encyclical letter, Laudato Si’.24
While talk of business’ triple bottom line (Elkington,
1998) may alert us to our responsibilities for life on the
planet (and the planet itself), we do not yet know how to
weigh or balance these many interests as we do business. Is
there a ‘‘life-principle’’ that renders non-human life on the
planet ‘‘morally considerable’’ (Goodpaster, 1978, p. 320)?
Religious conviction notwithstanding, it is clear that we
humans do have dominion over the earth. As Sanderson,
Jaiteh, Levy, Redford, Wannebo and Woolmer (2002, p.
902) pointed out, ‘‘The global extent of the human
footprint suggests that humans are stewards of nature,
whether we like it or not.’’ In this same vein, Hoffman and
Jennings (2015, p. 10) recently took stock of our new
‘‘Anthropocene Era’’; they concluded, ‘‘humans are now a
primary operating element in the Earth’s ecosystems.’’ We
agree with Kateb (2011, p. 116), ‘‘We must abandon the
human prejudice that animals and the rest of nature exist
solely for human use.’’ Business Participants and business
scholars alike need to come to terms with this broad
accountability challenge.
Control
Our fundamental criterion for the control of Business is
simple. At a minimum, we are to guard against any assault
on a business participant’s dignity. At our best, we strive to
enhance the participant’s dignity. This assurance of dignity
applies to humans, and just maybe to other life on the
planet, if not the planet itself. The implementation
challenges are threefold: (1) Who is to effect this control?
(2) Where will it happen? and (3) How will it happen?
The locus of control. Our understanding of the control of a
single corporation gives us some purchase to understand
how we might broadly control business. Moving from the
micro to the macro, we can look to individuals in
organizations to exhibit moral character and self-control
(Cohen & Morse, 2014; Crossan, Mazutis, Seijts, & Gandz,
2013). Engaged in a process of ‘‘mutual monitoring’’ within
a company, these individuals can hold each other to high
standards (Fama & Jensen, 1983). We have already noted
that firms may regulate their own behavior (Haufler,
2001). Of course, a firm’s board of directors and product
market competition itself also serve to keep a company
operating efficiently and effectively. But if the corpor-
ation’s board cannot control the firm’s management
(Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005) and if the market is uncompeti-
tive (Giroud & Miller, 2011), then the market for corporate
control serves as a bulwark against control failures
(Manne, 1965).25 Beyond that, firms are subject to activist
and social movement pressure (King & Pearce, 2010). And
of course, corporations are ultimately subject to govern-
ment control. As Wickersham (1918, p. 206) pointed out
over one hundred years ago, ‘‘No state can long endure,
which does not preserve its supremacy over private
combinations, whether in the garb of corporations, or
otherwise.’’ Well-functioning governments are to weigh
society’s competing interests and write laws to set wage
floors, product liability standards, environmental health
and safety standards, rules of competition, and more.
Governments must have a clear eye on collective value and
work to ensure its optimization.
One can imagine a world where corporations with
a new understanding of their role in the world exert23 In a similar vein, Singer (2009) reviews what he calls (on p. 222) our
‘‘savage’’ treatment of animals from the pre-Christian period to today. See
Chapter 5 for the review.
24 See hhttp://www.worldwatch.org/missioni and hhttp://www.millen-
niumassessment.org/en/About.htmli for an introduction to these orga-
nizations’ work and their reports. Pope Francis’ encyclical can be read
here: hhttp://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/docu-
ments/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.htmli
25 The market for corporate control, sometimes known as the takeover
market, refers to a practice where outside managers compete for the
opportunity to better lead a firm that they consider to be undervalued
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
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self-control in a realm of market competition, social
movements, and government oversight to honor the
dignity of business participants and create collective
value. Calling attention to fundamental changes in the
world of business and the corporation’s changing role in
that changing world, Scherer and Palazzo (2007, 2011)
would likely agree. But if companies, government and
civil society alike comprise business activity, then we
also need to go further and discern how best to control
government and the not-for-profit sector . . . and then
consider how the three commingle to create the good
society. There is much to be done. Along the way, we also
need to consider the second big question, ‘‘What
constitutes society?’’
One society or many. We might think of society in term of
nations. Perhaps the United States itself constitutes a
‘‘society.’’26 Conducted every five years, the US Census
Bureau counted 5.7 million firms and 90,056 local
government entities in 2012 (in addition to the Federal
government and the 50 state governments). The Internal
Revenue Service counted over 1.44 million tax-exempt
organizations in that year too.27 Perhaps we can consider
society to be the 314 million Americans who live with
those 5.7 million firms, 1.4 million not-for-profit orga-
nizations, and over 90,000 government entities.28 But then
again, the United States is just one of the 193 member
states in the United Nations. Are there 193 societies in the
world? Maybe; maybe not. We also need to account for
globalization, for the fact that the world is world is ‘‘flatter’’
than it has ever been (Friedman, 2007).
The current generation has borne witness to what
Feenstra (1998) calls the integration of trade and
disintegration of production in our global economy.
Connections are made routinely between firms in markets
and increasingly within firms as they operate across nation
states. For example, the United Nations (UNCTAD, 2009)
tells us that approximately 82,000 transnational corpora-
tions spanned the world with their 810,000 affiliate
organizations just a few years ago. In many ways, the
idea that a nation’s borders bind society seems outdated.
Perhaps it is best to consider business as it works in and for
humanity.
Let us say that there are about 200 countries in the
world (Greenland, Kosovo, and Taiwan, for example, are
not members of the UN but each is seen by many as a
country; Palestine and the Holy See are currently UN non-
member states). Therefore, humanity might comprise the
7.3 billion people who live in a world of approximately
200 independent states.29 What is the scale of business
activity if we think in these terms? These 200 national
governments and their hundreds of thousands of smaller
state and local government entities monitor and control
business activity in their borders. Can we estimate how
many companies operate within these borders? This is a
difficult assignment but still, we do have some idea. Dun &
Bradstreet (2015), for example, currently has data in hand
on 134,968,036 companies (from 235 countries). How
many not-for-profits (NFPs) are there in the world? We do
not know. With 1.44 million NFPs serving 314 million
Americans, that 1:218 ratio, suggests that we might see
33 million NFPs in the world. On the other hand, the United
Kingdom counted 161,266 voluntary organizations within
its borders in 2014. With a population of over 63.5 million,
that 1:394 ratio, suggests that there might be 18.3 million
NFPs in the world. Consider South Africa. There are 139,482
non-profit organizations in their country today. A 1:384
ratio suggests that there might be 19 million NFPs in the
world.30 Having said that, let’s imagine that these three
countries are outliers. Moreover, we know that many of
these NFPs operate on a global scale. Maybe there are far
fewer NFPs in the world. But even if the ratio was 1:3840,
we would still see 1.9 million NFPs. All we know for sure is
that the number is huge and that the worldwide business,
government and civil society relationships are extremely
complex.
A theory of the firm does not really help us understand,
much less control business at this level of analysis. Win or
lose the stockholder vs. stakeholder debate, the debate
itself seems to be off point. We need a theory of business
and business success if we are to understand and guide
business activity. Even in a world of 7.3 billion people, the
control tenets of a theory of business may help us more
than we might imagine. If every business participant is
worthy of dignity, then we have a principle that can orient
the governance and control of business activity the world
over. Each decision maker should honor the dignity of
those who affect and are affected by that decision maker’s
work. Diffuse that simple principle worldwide and the
world of business will change dramatically.
Note that this attention to each decision maker’s
conduct is quite different from the current focus on radical
transparency (Tapscott & Ticoll, 2003). To be sure,
complete information can help external monitor’s better
control business. And yes, the act of compiling and
preparing that information for external consumption can
affect how a firm does business. Still, the conduct that
helps optimize collective value may best be generated
within a business organization as it conducts its business,
and not from an external monitoring and control regime
that apprises the visible markers of business activity.
26 For example, Jones and Felps’ (2013b) work to change a corporation’s
objective function is rooted in their quest to ‘‘to improve social welfare for
the US society as a whole’’ (p. 350).
27 These organizations work in ten broad areas: Arts, culture, and
humanities; Education; Environment and animals; Health; Human
services; International, foreign affairs; Public, societal Benefit; Religion
related; Mutual/membership benefit; and Unknown, unclassified (http://
nccs.urban.org/classification/NTEE.cfm).
28 See hhttp://www.census.gov/econ/susb/i for a look at business
operations, hhttp://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/g12_org.pdfi for a look
at government entities, and hhttp://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
alfresco/publication-pdfs/413277-The-Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief–.PDFi
for a look at the NFP sector.
29 See hhttp://www.worldometers.info/world-population/i for the cur-
rent population of the world and any nation we discuss below, and
hhttp://www.un.org/en/members/#di for a list of the UN’s member
nations.
30 See hhttp://knowhownonprofit.org/basics/what-is-non-profiti for a
look at the UK’s NFP sector and hhttp://www.npo.gov.za/i for a similar
look at the NFP sector in South Africa.
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In fact, unlimited disclosure may even have unintended
negative effects (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012). We believe
that the path to optimized collective value begins with an
endorsement of the Dignity Threshold.
With the scale of business activity as large as it is, we
are under no illusion that this diffusion process will be
simple. That said, the idea and importance of dignity is
hardly unknown. It has been with us for over two thousand
years. It has been enshrined in a global human rights
declaration and even in some national laws. Combine that
fact with the widespread unease we chronicled at the
beginning of this paper, and we just may find ourselves at a
propitious moment in history to launch what might called
a dignitarian social movement in business. This kind of
transformation of business practice will not happen on its
own. It may take a social movement.
A social movement. A normative theory carries action
implications. It may well be that those who resonate with
these ideas might become what Sunstein (1996, p. 919)
called ‘‘norm entrepreneurs,’’ those who work to imagine a
new future and create the ‘‘norm bandwagons’’ and ‘‘norm
cascades’’ that bring it to life. Academics can certainly play
a role by developing the theory that undergirds the new
norm and of course, work to make a better world (Walsh,
2015). Sunstein (1996, p. 929) nicely articulated the norm
entrepreneurs’ assignment. Theory in hand, their work
begins by signaling a personal commitment to change.
They also need to find fellow travelers to refine their ideas
and help bring them to life. Such coalition members may
not be hard to find. Lagon and Arend (2014b), for example,
recently articulated a ‘‘who, what, when, where, why and
how’’ agenda for those working to bring a commitment to
human dignity to our international institutions. With
business as the largest transnational institution on the
world stage today, our colleagues in public policy might
welcome commitments and contributions from those in
the world of business. Sunstein goes on to argue that
bringing new ideas to life will involve a focus on costs and
benefits. Norm entrepreneurs need to show that ignoring
the Dignity Threshold seems to be – or is – less costly than
adhering to it. They must also show that compliance with
this new norm seems to be – or in fact, is – more beneficial
than operating without it. A cost/benefit calculation, of
course, implicates a consideration of just what constitutes
a cost and a benefit; indeed, it calls the question of what
constitutes Business Success.
Success
Business Success is marked optimized Collective Value,
optimized subject to clearing the Dignity Threshold. While
we know what we want to see from business in a
conceptual sense, some may ask whether we will know it
when we see it. They will wonder whether we can measure
Optimized Collective Value. How can we know if decision
makers in companies, government, and the not-for-profit
sector recognize the inherent worth of every Business
Participant? Can we know whether they lead with practical
wisdom (phronesis)? How will we know whether their
decisions meet the Dignity Threshold? These are mighty
challenges. There are two broad issues to consider as we
move forward. The first is that we need to consider the
relationship between the measurement of success and
success itself. Second, we need to consider the dynamic
nature of the theory, if not any intervention born of the
theory. In particular, we need to consider how to handle
failure on the road to success.
Success and its measurement. We need not look far for
measurement inspiration. Diener and Seligman’s (2004)
quest to create an economy of well-being caught our
attention. We took a careful look at their call for a national
well-being index. They believe that a multimillion-dollar
investment in an annual national survey would bring great
benefit to the American public. They rely on what they call
the ‘‘psychological Heisenberg principle’’ to make their
case:
[W]hat a society measures will in turn influence the
things that it seeks. . . . If a society systematically and
regularly assesses well-being, people will focus more of
their attention on well-being, and learn more about its
causes (2004, p. 23).
We believe that the reverse of this principle also holds.
If society calls more and more attention to dignity and
collective value in business, then society will in time move
to assess them. Note too that any effort to bring Sunstein’s
(1996) cost/benefit approach to social movement creation
cannot move forward absent a dignity initiative to
investigate if not celebrate. We are impressed and inspired
by the United Kingdom’s Dignity in Care initiative.
Launched in November 2006, the country’s National
Dignity Council has been administering the program ever
since. Their webpage succinctly captures their aspirations:
The campaign’s core values are about having dignity in
our hearts minds and actions, changing the culture of
care services and placing a greater emphasis on
improving the quality of care and the experience of
citizens using services including NHS [National Health
Service] hospitals, community services, care homes and
home support services (http://www.dignityincare.or-
g.uk/About/Dignity_in_Care_campaign/).
They currently count 58,000 ‘‘dignity champions’’ who
work to ensure that people are treated in a respectful and
dignified manner when they use Britain’s health and social
services. Sustained in part by a host of ‘‘dignity champion
networks,’’ these champions and sympathetic health care
providers call nationwide attention to their work every
year in an annual ‘‘dignity action day.’’ Perhaps a similarly
inspired ‘‘Dignity in Business’’ movement will help bring
dignity to the world of business and at the same time serve
as a catalyst to measure Business Success. That certainly
seems to be a worthy aspiration.
While we know of no dedicated effort to collect data on
the dignified treatment of Business Participants, we do
know that some in the world do collect the kinds of data
that Diener and Seligman (2004) desire. More than
20 European countries came together in 2002 to sponsor
a large biennial cross-national survey. The European Social
Survey reports data on personal and societal well-being,
and even some of the kinds of issues we might envision in a
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worldwide Dignity in Business survey (e.g., treatment by,
and trust, in various institutions of government).31 The
existence of this international survey effort gives us hope
that we might one day see an international Dignity in
Business survey effort.32 We can imagine a role for
universities in this effort. The University of Chicago with
its National Opinion Research Center and the University of
Michigan with its Institute for Social Research, for
example, might collaborate with other universities in
the world to launch such a global survey effort.
The road to business success. A normative theory is defined
by its aspirations. Our aspirations here are very high. After
all, we invoke a world where collective value is optimized,
where the dignity of every business participant is recog-
nized and honored, where every act and decision in the
world of business clears the Dignity Threshold. We also
imagine a global survey effort to appraise and enable our
movement toward such optimized collective value. Two
fundamental qualities define this aspiration. First, with
business as our unit of analysis, we are well aware that
our unit of analysis is as macro as can be in our field. On
the other hand, the mechanism that fuels this normative
theory is quite micro. Business participants’ everyday acts
of dignity undergird the creation of collective value. This
micro focus may be at once the theory’s strength and its
limitation. The strength is that we do not need to imagine
some kind of supranational governance and control regime
to better the world. Indeed, some would see an omnipotent
and global regulatory regime as more suffocating than
ennobling. All we ask is that each business participant
treats each other with dignity, all the while respecting and
supporting business’s broader purpose. Therein lays the
limitation. Not every business participant in a world of
7.3 billion people will get the message and not everyone
who does will find it easy to live such a life. In fact, history
shows us that our species is prone to violence (Pinker,
2011), perhaps the ultimate act of indignity.
How can we stay on the road to Business Success? To be
sure, with even the best of intentions, business partici-
pants will have trouble. Haslam and Loughnan (2014) tell
us that we are prone to dehumanize each other. We also
know that a record of moral behavior in no way guarantees
that we will treat the next person we encounter in a like
fashion. Indeed, the research on moral licensing (Monen
and Miller, 2001) tells us that we can even expect that
moral person to behave immorally or unethically that next
time (Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015; Merritt,
Effron, & Monin, 2010).33 It is not easy to treat every person
we encounter with dignity. Moreover, Hollensbe, Wookey,
Hickey, George, and Nichols, (2014, p. 1230) point out a
peril unique to organizational life. We often encounter
each other not as individuals but as a part of a collective in
an organization. They write, ‘‘each person deserves human
dignity as a who, not a what, as a someone, not a something,
yet much of the language of business subtly objectifies
people generally as ‘‘human capital’’ or ‘‘human resources.’’
The problem is that we can only know so many people by
name. Leaders of large entities, those who by necessity
manage ‘‘human resources,’’ need to remember that each
person in that collective is an individual worthy of dignity.
We need to keep our common humanity in front of mind as
we encounter each other.
The road to Business Success is likely to be a bumpy one.
We can vow to treat others with dignity but it will be hard
to walk that talk. Indeed, social psychological research tells
us just how hard it is to exert self-control in our lives
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; De Ridder, Lensvelt-
Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, & Baumeister, 2012). Envision-
ing a social movement to bring a fundamental appreciation
of dignity to the world of business, this movement should
also work to support business participants in their avowed
efforts to treat each other with dignity. And when we
inevitably fall short, all we can do is practice restorative
justice. We forgive each other and strive to do better the
next time (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Goodstein &
Aquino, 2010). In short, we can handle the indignities of life
in the same way we handle the sometimes-painful legacies
our predecessors left us. We acknowledge them, learn from
them, forgive others (and ourselves if need be), and press
forward in pursuit of the good.
Conclusion
Our goal has been to address the composition fallacy we
discovered in the scholarly world of corporate governance.
Recognizing that no theory of the firm can serve us well
when we attempt to understand the place of business in
society, we developed what we hope will be the beginnings
of a theory of business. The theory is both empirical and
normative. We developed the conceptual building blocks
for such a theory and then began to specify the
mechanisms that link them. To say that a theory of
business must account for the purpose of business is one
thing, it is something else entirely to articulate just what
that purpose is. We tried to step up to that challenge. Doing
so, we created a normative theory. We can now answer the
riddle we posed at the paper’s beginning: ‘‘Law is to justice,
as medicine is to health, as business is to optimized
collective value.’’
31 See hhttp://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/index.htmli for an
overview of the survey effort and hhttp://www.europeansocialsur-
vey.org/docs/findings/
ESS6_toplines_issue_5_personal_and_social_wellbeing.pdfi for a look at
their efforts in the area of personal and societal well-being. We should
point out that Australia and the United Kingdom each alone collect the
kinds of index data that Diener and Seligman (2004) desire (see Cummins,
Eckersley, Pallant, Van Vugt, & Misajon, 2003; Self, Thomas, & Randall,
2012 for some discussion of this work). Kahneman and Krueger (2003)
believe we could see such a survey effort in the US one day.
32 The Porter and Stern (2015) effort that we mentioned earlier holds
promise. Using publicly available data (Stern, Wares, & Orzell, 2015, p.
24), their ambitious Social Progress Imperative is very alert to people’s
rights and freedoms the world over. Perhaps as their effort gains steam,
they can collaborate with others to collect the kinds of dignity data the
world so needs.
33 We see a similar surprise at the firm level of analysis. In a paper
entitled ‘‘Why ‘Good’ Firms do Bad Things,’’ Mishina, Dykes, Block, and
Pollock (2010) showed us that the most successful firms that are the ones
most prone to illegal behavior.
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Our project answers Brief’s (2000) provocative ques-
tion, ‘‘Whom shall we serve?’’ It may seem quixotic but we
are trying to serve humanity here. In doing so, we are
responding to Tsui’s (2013) call to create socially
responsible scholarship. In Tsui’s (2013, p. 381) view,
such scholarship both seeks truth and attempts to improve
the human condition. She quoted Einstein as she identified
the second criterion. In Einstein’s mind, that second
criterion is primary: ‘‘Concern for making life better for
ordinary humans must be the chief objective of science’’
(Tsui, 2013, p. 380).
We admit that the phrase ‘‘optimized collective value’’
does not roll off the tongue in the same way that the
words ‘‘justice’’ and ‘‘health’’ do. If forced to sum up the
phrase in a word, we would choose the word ‘‘prosperity.’’
But we would do so with a caveat. The definition of
prosperity must be an expansive one. Some view
prosperity as simple financial well-being. We are inter-
ested in a special kind of well-being, one that honors the
dignity of those who affect and are affected by the
creation of that wealth. We are interested in the kind of
well-being that reflects a world of business where its focal
and contextual purposes are met.
We call on our colleagues to refine and extend these
ideas. Look at our definitions, propositions, and open
questions. Have we overstated, understated, misstated or
overlooked anything? We have some awareness of what
we do not know. Therefore, we ask our colleagues in the
arts and sciences (e.g., anthropologists, economists,
philosophers, political scientists, psychologists, sociolo-
gists, and more) and the professional schools (e.g.,
business, law, public health, public policy, and others) to
help us better appreciate how business, government and
civil society can work together for the pursuit of collective
value.
Assuming that these ideas do have some appeal, we
need help to bring our normative ideas to life. How can we
promote dignity for every Business Participant? We will
need to find ways to measure Business Success at the same
time that we look for ways to promote it. Great Britain’s
Dignity in Care initiative and the international effort to
create and administer the European Social Survey inspire
us on both dimensions. Our dream may not be a pipe
dream.
Still, we know that these efforts will take time. Years
ago, Whetton (1989) asked the question, ‘‘What constitu-
tes a theoretical contribution?’’ He used the six journalists’
questions to answer his own question – and added one, the
‘‘So what?’’ question. That last question looms large. This
project reminds us that legacy matters. Our fondest hope is
that future generations will continue to imagine and work
to create a world of business that honors the dignity of
those who affect and are affected by its activity.
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